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Historical and Cultural Background 
Liz Tomlin 
Part One: Politics, Society and Culture 
Introduction 
By 1995 the seemingly unstoppable march of globalisation was well underway, and it 
becomes impossible, in this final volume, to neatly extricate British politics of the period 
from events of global significance such as the expansion of the European Union, the terrorist 
attack on New York’s World Trade Centre, and the financial banking crisis that struck the 
economies of the developed world in 2008. Since the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the people 
of the twelve member states had been European citizens, with common passports and the 
right to move, live and vote in any country in the European Union (EU). The Treaty also 
defined the stages that would be required to achieve economic and monetary union, which 
finally arrived for the majority of member states with the advent of the Euro in 1999. In 2004 
the EU expanded to incorporate member states from much of Eastern Europe, with Romania 
and Bulgaria joining in 2007 and Croatia in 2013.  
 
The dissolution of many of the national boundaries that had previously existed on the 
continent did have an impact on British artists and cultural organisations over this period who 
found partnerships and movement across and within the continental European countries 
significantly easier than had previously been the case. The expansion of European festivals, 
and the development of the British Council support for overseas touring, both discussed in 
chapter two, offered British companies opportunities to embed themselves in an increasingly 
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unified European network of theatre and performance, develop international partnerships, and 
benefit from the often significantly greater financial rewards that accompanied commissions 
of their work from countries where art enjoyed greater subsidy than was the case at home. 
 
If the identity of a distinctly British theatre ecology was to shift under European expansion 
and increased integration, it was also to be further complicated by the devolution of Wales 
and Scotland and the prospect of Scottish independence.  On 11 September 1997 the 
referendum for an independent Scottish Parliament was held and proved a decisive victory 
(sixty three point five per cent of voters voting yes) which granted Scotland devolution and 
tax-varying powers.  A week later the Welsh vote for devolution was also won, albeit by a 
tiny margin of fifty one per cent against forty nine point nine per cent, for a Welsh Assembly 
which would be without the tax-varying powers of the Scottish Parliament.  
 
In the 2007 elections, the Scottish National Party (SNP), under Alex Salmond, formed the 
government in Scotland for the first time, bringing Labour dominance in Scotland to an end. 
The SNP’s vision of a fully independent Scotland was arguably strengthened by the 
Conservative/Liberal Coalition victory in Westminster in 2010, whose politically regressive 
austerity measures further alienated Scottish voters always well to the left of the majority of 
the English. This shift in Westminster was perhaps one catalyst for the SNP’s more decisive 
2011 victory, this time with an overall majority, which pushed the UK Government to 
recognise Scotland’s right to hold an independence referendum (Curtice et al, 2013, 141) that 
is set to take place on 18 September 2014.  
 
Political devolution had been pre-empted by the devolution of the Arts Councils of Great 
Britain in 1994, and would further consolidate the distinct cultural trajectories that were 
3 
 
already emerging in line with the different national agendas, linguistic contexts, and political 
colours of England, Scotland and Wales, as will be discussed throughout this chapter.  In all 
three nation states, however, the fields of politics, society and culture were to become 
increasingly difficult to distinguish from one another.  One of the most significant 
characteristics of the New Labour era that dominates this period was the appropriation of 
society and culture into the politics of government across all departments and in each of the 
three nation states in question. This chapter examines, above all else, how culture was 
fashioned into an essential political instrument for the advancement of social objectives, 
economic prosperity and national prestige, both under the Blair government of Great Britain, 
and the devolved administrations of Scotland and Wales. 
 
 New Labour 
After eighteen years of Conservative Government in Britain, the 1997 victory of Labour 
under Tony Blair was greeted with some relief by the artistic community.  Not only did New 
Labour, towards the end of its first term, virtually double the grant-in-aid available for arts 
funding but there was a sense that this government understood culture to be central to the 
country’s status and prosperity in a way that had not previously been the case. Before looking 
in detail at the ways in which arts and culture were to be largely transformed under Blair’s 
‘Cool Britannia’ branding exercise, and New Labour’s influence on Arts Council policy, it is 
useful to outline the more general political direction of Britain under New Labour, which was 
not entirely as anticipated in the celebratory spirit of 1997, the year that we were promised by 
Labour’s election anthem that things could only get better.  
 
Blair’s re-branding of the Labour Party was marked decisively at the 1994 annual conference 
by the removal of a central commitment within Clause IV of the Party’s constitution to 
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‘common ownership of the means of production’. This was the turning point between ‘Old’ 
and ‘New’ Labour; between ‘old’ socialist principles of nationalisation and state ownership 
and Labour’s ‘new’ neo-liberalist embrace of the free market and privatisation as endorsed by 
Margaret Thatcher. If politics up to 1989, in the context of alternative cultural movements, 
had generally been seen in terms of left-wing /right-wing dichotomies, New Labour was to 
expedite the increasing suspicion of such binaries that had been growing since the failure of 
socialism in Eastern Europe. Leggett argues that Tony Blair’s New Labour agenda ‘led this 
tendency, with [its] frequent ... claims that social change has consigned left and right to 
history’ (Leggett, 2005, 15). This, of course, was the decisive move in Blair’s proposal of a 
‘third way politics’; less historical truth than an ideological strategy that resulted in 
successfully manoeuvring Labour to the centre of the political spectrum, and outlawing 
everything that stood to the left of it. New Labour’s appropriation of the neo-liberalist agenda 
set by Thatcher was presented by Blair’s ubiquitous spin doctors as a centre-left third way, in 
order to rebrand what had been previously seen as a right-wing ideology as a new kind of 
politics which ‘transcended’ the traditional notions of ideological class conflict and, in Blair’s 
own words, ‘left the redundant twentieth-century battles between capitalism and communism 
behind’ (Cockerell, 2001, 574).  
 
Despite New Labour’s embrace of the doctrine of neo-liberalism, to which I will return, there 
is also ample evidence throughout Blair’s term of office, of a genuine commitment to the 
redistributive social democracy that had historically characterised the Labour movement. In 
the wake of nearly two decades of Conservative rule, initiatives such as Sure Start, the 
minimum wage, the New Deal, the Educational Maintenance Allowance, Tax Credits, 
Education Action Zones and significant public investment in Health and Education, all 
contributed to this Government’s success in stalling the income gap between the best and 
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worst paid, reducing levels of child and pensioner poverty, and maintaining high levels of 
employment (see Astle and Murray, 2006). However, despite ten years of huge public 
investment, and the wide reach of the government’s social inclusion agenda across all areas 
of policy, at the end of Blair’s term of office there remained, from a social democratic 
perspective, notable failures.  
 
Although the economy was strong, there were always indicators of the financial crash that 
was to follow, including high levels of consumer debt, and a housing market bubble that was 
always fated to be unsustainable. While levels of income inequality had been stalled, if not 
reversed; wealth inequality, partly due to the rising value of property, was ‘higher even than 
in the 1980s’ (Astle and Murray, 2006, 24) with the richest five per cent of the population 
owning seventy per cent of its wealth by 2001 (Astle and Murray, 2006, 26-7). Social 
mobility had declined and looked set to decline further, and residual pockets of poverty and 
social deprivation showed stubborn resistance to Blair’s reforms; particularly in black and 
minority ethnic communities where persistent educational underachievement threatened to 
sustain the higher than average levels of poverty and unemployment for future generations 
(Astle and Murray, 2006, 26).  New Labour’s social inclusion agenda, both in its successes 
and failures, was hugely significant in shaping arts policy, particularly in the areas of 
widening participation for black and ethnic minorities, those from less-privileged socio-
economic backgrounds and children and young people. A brief examination of the 
ideological basis of New Labour’s policies, at their most fundamental level, can clarify both 
why the arts became so vital as a means of improving social inclusion, and the reasons behind 
the rather limited success of their endeavours.    
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‘Education education education’ was Blair’s personal mantra, and his passion to improve the 
life-chances of the less privileged in society, from the earliest point possible, lay at the heart 
of his government’s drive for social inclusion, and its emphasis and significant expenditure 
on early years schemes such as Sure Start. However, as Astle and Murray observed in 2006: 
‘[d]espite the government’s efforts, class and wealth remain key determinants of British 
children’s educational prospects’ (Astle and Murray, 2006, 30). Eric Shaw argues likewise 
that ‘while the outcome [of Labour’s redistributive policies] has been a substantial movement 
of resources to the least well endowed, it falls well short of any significant advance towards 
equality of opportunity’ (Shaw, 2007, 202).  Shaw identified a key reason for this as the 
persistent and growing inequality of wealth distribution, which rendered Blair’s rhetorical 
emphasis on ‘equal opportunity’ at the start of a child’s life unable to counter the hierarchy of 
economic privilege into which that child is born.    
 
The problem, it appears, was that Blair’s efforts to follow a progressively redistributive 
agenda, was counterpointed at every turn by his contradictory embrace of the neo-liberalist 
notion of meritocracy. Tony Wright argues, ‘among socialists who have taken values 
seriously, there has been wide agreement that equality should be regarded as a key socialist 
value, perhaps even the socialist value’ (Wright, 1986, 33 in Eatwell, 1989, 61). Blair, 
however, was no socialist, and his rhetoric and policy was directed, not towards equality of 
outcome (a levelling of the gap between the poorest and the wealthiest) but towards equality 
of opportunity, in the belief that if everyone was given equal opportunity, then the 
meritocratic principle could be left to itself to ‘level up’ those who took best advantage of 
such opportunity. However, as Shaw explains ‘relational equality was impossible in a society 
characterised by cumulative, persisting and entrenched inequalities in the distribution of 
income and wealth’ (Shaw, 2007, 35). 
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While Wales, and Scotland in particular, used their new legislative powers under devolution 
to operate within a more traditional Labour model of social democracy, instigating 
progressive national policies on health, social care and education; England, under the 
unfettered control of New Labour, was forced to embrace Blair’s preference for the market-
driven, neo-liberalist model of capitalism, as advocated by the Anglo-American politics of 
Regan and Thatcher (Norris, 1999, 27-28). It is not, as Colin Leys notes, that the state 
becomes impotent in the face of market-driven politics, but more worryingly that ‘it is 
constrained to use its power to advance the process of commodification’ (Leys, 2001, 2). 
Leys describes how the total capitulation of the New Labour government to the market-
driven politics of neo-liberalism opened the floodgates for firms to ‘constantly explore ways 
to break out of the boundaries set by state regulation, including the boundaries that close non-
market spheres to commodification and profit- making’ (Leys, 2001, 4).  
 
The most significant cultural consequence of this intrusion of the marketplace into previously 
non-market spheres, as Colin Leys warns, is the danger that it threatens ‘the destruction of 
non-market spheres of life on which social solidarity and active democracy have always 
depended’ (Leys, 2001, 4). Education and cultural activities, alongside health and welfare 
benefits, have historically been considered to be public goods which under ‘ethical socialist 
thinking’ (Shaw, 2007, 36) should be ‘contrasted with commodities in that they were defined 
by their intrinsic value: they were particularly “human” in that they were essential to human 
well-being and fulfilment’ (Keat, 2000, 26-7 in Shaw, 2007, 39). As such, they represented 
vital non-market spheres, in Eric Shaw’s words, ‘from which market exchange and the 
commercial ethos should be barred as a matter of principle’ (Shaw, 2007, 36, original 
emphasis). David Marquand concurs that ‘[t]he attempt to force these relationships into a 
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market mould undermines the service ethic, degrades the institutions that embody it and robs 
the notion of common citizenship of part of its meaning’ (Marquand, 1999, 254). These are 
the fundamental and deeply ideological consequences of the commercialisation of Britain’s 
public services that began under a Labour government, from the creeping privatisation that 
invaded the NHS and state education to the commodification of English universities, a 
process that began with the introduction of student fees in 2006.  
 
The creep of the market into traditionally non-market spheres has also impacted on the 
independent theatre ecology across the UK. A sector which had been staunchly oppositional 
and collectivist under Thatcher was incorporated by New Labour into a creative or cultural 
‘industry’ in which companies were now expected to be run like small businesses, with 
entrepreneurial leadership, mission statements, ‘diverse income streams’, and sustainable 
strategies for growth. As Michael McKinnie argues, such a shift enabled the notion of 
‘culture’ and the ‘arts’ to be captured within a market sector, to subdue its potential to oppose 
market structures, or function beyond them (McKinnie, 2004). No longer were theatre 
companies expected to challenge the politics of the state as had been the case under Thatcher. 
Rather, under Blair’s leadership of the Labour Party, the arts had become, as Robert Hewison 
notes, ‘entirely instrumental, a matter of “value for money”, and the opposition between 
culture and industrial society has disappeared’ (Hewison, 1994, 30). Precisely how the arts 
were to be transformed into instruments of government policy, I shall now detail, by first 
examining their key role in the national branding exercises that were to define ‘Cool 
Britannia’ as a union, and Wales and Scotland as newly devolved nations, in the early 2000s. 
 
Cool Britannia and the Creative Industries 
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The creative industries were central to Tony Blair’s ‘Cool Britannia’ project, but as Andrew 
Ross proposes, the rebranding of artists and so-called ‘creatives’ in the UK was part of a 
much wider global shift that grew out of the surge in internet-based operations that 
constituted the ‘dot-com boom’ of the late 1990s (Ross, 2009, 16). This new ‘composite 
“creative economy”’, as Ross argues, was ‘perfectly adapted to the freelancing profile 
favored by advocates of liberalization’, because of the ‘self-directed work mentality of 
artists’, and so ‘occupied a key evolutionary niche on the business landscape’ (Ross, 2009, 
16).  Ross credits Tony Blair with creating the most definitive packaging of the ‘CI policy 
paradigm’, which was then rolled out as a viable development strategy across the globe, ‘to 
persuade bureaucrats that human capital and IP [Intellectual Property] are the keys to winning 
a permanent seat in the knowledge-based economy’ (Ross, 2009, 20). The arts, of course, 
could not stand alone in this brave new branding exercise as they were renowned for their 
resistance to market place imperatives – that is to say that they have always, whether via 
private patronage or public funding – needed subsidy to survive. The incorporation of the arts 
into the Creative Industries enabled a whole range of other, more profit-making enterprises, 
including software, computer services and advertising, to support the balance sheet of the 
new business model, which became a ‘revenue powerhouse’ that generated £60 to £112 
billion per year (Ross, 2009, 24).  
 
The arts were required in this portfolio of creative activity to add the kind of international 
prestige that names like Damien Hirst, Irvine Welsh and Oasis could offer. Britpop and 
Britart in particular, were vital to the marketing side of ‘Cool Britannia’, which became, as 
Ross argues, ‘a massive PR campaign to persuade the world that the country Napoleon once 
mocked as a nation of shopkeepers was now a nation of artists and designers, with the future 
in their enterprising bones’ (Ross, 2009, 24). Blair had seized the Cool Britannia initiative as 
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key to his party’s electoral victory in 1997, as Ken Urban, among other commentators 
observes (Urban, 2008, 39-41). The marketing emphasis on the young, the cutting edge and 
the risky was cleverly designed to separate Blair’s government-in-waiting both from the 
previous Tory administration and the socialist identity of ‘Old’ Labour, and it bled into all 
aspects of artistic and cultural life.  
 
Stephen Daldry, then-director of the Royal Court, towed the Cool Britannia line, 
seeking to create a ‘cult of youth’, that was characterised by work such as Sarah Kane’s 
Blasted (1995), that caused the media storm of the decade when it opened at the Court 
in 1995 (Urban, 2008, 42). However, Graham Saunders suggests that theatre always 
held an ‘outsider status on the fringes’ of the Cool Britannia project (Saunders, 2008, 
9), with writer Mark Ravenhill specifically satirising the superficiality of Blair’s 
branding in Shopping and Fucking (1996) and Some Explicit Polaroids (1999) 
(Saunders, 2008, 11). Ravenhill, along with Sarah Kane, was at the core of what came 
to be known as the ‘in yer face theatre’ generation (Sierz, 2000), whose violent and 
often sexually-explicit new writing developed concurrently with the Cool Britannia 
project in the mid-late 1990s but was always regarded, according to Saunders, ‘with 
some degree of circumspection’ by New Labour, arguably because, unlike in Britpop 
and Britart, they saw themselves implicitly or explicitly satirised in much of the work 
that was produced (Saunders, 2008, 12). Ken Urban also concurs that Kane, Ravenhill 
and their contemporaries resisted being co-opted by Blair’s rebranding but formed 
instead ‘a youth-based counter-politics to the cynicism and opportunism of Cool 
Britannia’(Urban, 2008, 39).  
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The most significant legacy of Cool Britannia was the success of London’s bid to host the 
2012 Olympics, a prize won by New Labour at the height of the boom years, and delivered 
by the Lib-Con Coalition at the peak of austerity. The Olympic Ceremony, directed by Danny 
Boyle (who had made his name directing Welsh’s Trainspotting in 1996), was a masterclass 
in brand-Britain promotion. Interspersed with the stalwarts of traditional Britishness – the 
industrial revolution, Shakespeare, a politically astute homage to the NHS, and a brilliant 
fusion of James Bond and the Queen – Boyle’s opening ceremony presented twenty-first 
century Britain first and foremost as a land of cultural expertise (particularly in digital 
developments) and ethnic diversity. 
 
Ben Pitcher notes how central the notion of race was to the success of the ‘Cool Britannia’ 
project in his examination of the 1997 Demos pamphlet written for New Labour by Mark 
Leonard, the self-declared inventor of the term (Pitcher, 2009, 46-48). Leonard’s Britain, as 
Pitcher discusses, proposes the slogan ‘United Colours of Britain’ (Leonard, 1997, 56) after 
the famous Benetton advertisement campaign.  In this way he ‘weaves the nation’s brand 
identity on a multicultural loom: both “edgy” and “contemporary”, the “United Colours of 
Britain” perfectly articulates a pluralist approach to national identity as refracted through the 
imagery of the advertising world’ (Pitcher, 2009, 47). This new national identity, Pitcher 
argues, was required to distinguish itself from an out-of-date nationalism that was known for 
its implicit racism and essentialism, in order that Blair could reclaim the ‘One Nation Britain’ 
that had formerly belonged to right wing politics. To this end, ‘the subject of race has 
recently been approached in a new register that claims an ethos of cultural, religious and 
racial pluralism as its own. That which had stood outside of or in opposition to the state has 
become articulated as one of its core principles’ (Pitcher, 2009, 34). New Labour’s co-option 
of cultural diversity was central to Blair’s image of a Cool Britannia; a project that was 
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particularly vital to construct in the light of devolution. In an article analysing the 
displacement of a traditional English identity in UK tourism literature at the turn of the 
Millennium, José Igor Prieto Arranz concludes that: 
 
It is a new Britannia aiming to cover all of the British nations; a new Britannia 
trying to come to terms with Britain’s postcolonial reality, fully recognising the 
richness and variety to be found in an essentially cosmopolitan society; a new 
Britannia that seems to have left behind the traditional rural presumption and that 
has taken the great industrial city as a powerful emblem for everything that 
Englishness was not; (Arranz, 2006, 196) 
 
This was a rejection of ‘Englishness’, historically associated with a ‘bad’ brand of 
nationalism and insular pockets of mono-cultural rural heritage, in favour of an urban, 
multi-cultural and pluralist Britain that encompassed all of its parts. As such Cool 
Britannia was the pro-Union counterpoint to the emerging and influential branding and 
nation-building exercises undertaken by Wales and Scotland on the road to ever-greater 
independence, as detailed later in this chapter. No degree of emphasis on cultural 
diversity within this New Britain, however, could neutralise the political and media 
hostility to those whose citizenship lay outside of it. For not everyone, it seems, was 
welcome in New Labour’s Cool Britannia. 
 
Immigration and Asylum 
Andrew Geddes describes the increasing politicisation of migration since the 1990s as a 
result of the ‘third-wave’ of post-war migration, ‘with a particularly noticeable increase in 
asylum seeking migration and migration defined by state policies as illegal’ (Geddes, 2003, 
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17). As the numbers of refugees seeking asylum in the UK began to rise, so did the intensity 
of the press hostility, fed by often spurious statistics from anti-immigration groups such as 
Migration Watch, to create a climate where the notion of asylum seeker became synonymous 
with non-white, third world, bogus interlopers who would put pressure on housing, schools, 
and other public services, drain the welfare system and threaten the ‘British’ way of life 
(Finney and Simpson, 2009). Stratham and Morrison’s  review of media coverage in the mid 
1990s concludes that immigration and asylum politics made up ‘37% of news coverage in 
The Guardian, 46% in The Times, and 55% in the Daily Mail’ (in Finney and Simpson, 2009, 
51). Whether the media was following or creating public opinion is a question beyond the 
scope of this chapter, but responses to a 2009 MORI poll evidence that ‘[m]ore than a third of 
the public now regularly cite race and immigration as among the most important issues facing 
the country, significantly higher than in most European countries and a sharp increase from a 
decade ago’ (Spencer, 2011, 1).  
 
Public hostility to immigrants was further exacerbated by New Labour’s spectacularly 
conservative estimate of the number of Polish migrants who would come to the UK for work 
after Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004. The predicted figure was 26,000 over the first two 
years, the total figure over that time was estimated (not including spouses and children) at 
between 427,000 and 600,000 (when self-employed were included) and resident communities 
in particularly affected areas were woefully unprepared for the volume of migration they 
experienced (Marr, 2007, 593). The public hostility to asylum seekers and economic 
migrants, stoked by the right wing press, and particularly evident in economically 
disadvantaged communities who saw themselves in direct competition with the newcomers 
for housing and other resources, led to a rise in popularity for Britain’s right wing parties, and 
a swing to the right by the mainstream parties in an attempt to appease public opinion. 
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Electoral support for the United Kingdom Independence Party’s (UKIP) stance on 
immigration and their desire to leave the EU, evidenced by the party’s gains in the 2013 local 
elections and the 2014 European elections, has already played into the hands of the Tories on 
the right of the Conservative party and might yet move the national debate for all parties 
towards increasingly isolationist policy making in the future. 
 
Between 1993 and 2002 there were four attempts to adapt the 1971 immigration legislation in 
response to asylum seeking legislation, each one seeking to impose tighter controls on entry, 
and more punitive containment of those refugees who had succeeded in obtaining illegal 
entry to Britain. The media hostility and the legal sanctions imposed by governments in 
response have had the effect of galvanising support for refugees and asylum seekers within 
the artistic community, and precipitated the growth of refugee theatre on a global scale, 
particularly in the UK and Australia (Jeffers, 2012, 43). Refugee Week, first held in London 
in 2002, was repeated annually across numerous cities in the UK as Alison Jeffers reports, 
from 225 events in 2002, to 450 events attended by an estimated 250,000 people by 2006 
(Jeffers, 2012, 113). Annual refugee arts festivals were also established in London, 
Birmingham and Manchester (Jeffers, 2012, 113) and there was evidence of a significant 
growth in companies working in this area. Banner Theatre - Wild Geese (2005) and They get 
free mobiles... don’t they? (2007); Red Room Theatre - The Bogus Woman (2001) and 
Unstated (2009); Ice and Fire - I have before me a remarkable document given to me by a 
young lady from Rwanda (2003) and Crocodile Seeking Refuge (2005); and Cardboard 
Citizens - Pericles (2003) are examples of just four companies that have developed ongoing 
projects with refugees and engaged explicitly with the politics of refuge and asylum over the 
2000s.   
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War on Terror 
Almost 3,000 people were killed as a result of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre 
on 11 September 2001. The direct economic cost ran into billions of dollars, and the global 
political consequences which were to continue into the next decade, and most probably well 
beyond, immediately began to take shape. The military reprisals were the most visible 
manifestations of these consequences. On 7 October 2001, less than a month after the attacks 
and the subsequent identification of Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda as the perpetrators, 
British and American air attacks against the Taliban in Afghanistan, where bin Laden and his 
organisation were believed to be hiding, began. To prove more controversial still was the 
invasion of Iraq on 19 March 2003, undertaken by British and American troops regardless of 
the absence of a UN Mandate, raising serious questions surrounding the legality of the 
invasion and inspiring the biggest ever anti-war demonstration in the UK. Protestors voiced 
suspicions that this was as much about instigating the regime change that Bush’s father had 
neglected to accomplish in the first Gulf War, and the protection of oil revenues in the 
Middle East, as it was about Saddam Hussein’s harbouring of weapons of mass destruction 
that constituted a real and genuine threat to either country’s national security. Such suspicions 
were not eased by Bush’s insistence on linking Iraq with al-Qaeda without the slightest 
grounds for so doing, in attempts to justify the invasion as part of his ill-advised declaration 
of a ‘War on Terror’, mounted in response to the terrorist attacks on America. 
 
In the UK, the impact of Tony Blair’s decision to stand ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with Bush was 
far reaching. First and foremost, it engendered a deep distrust of Blair and New Labour that 
almost certainly played a key role in Blair’s own subsequent fall in popularity, and arguably 
had some lasting impact on the fortunes of the party itself.  Suspicions surrounding the 
government’s claim that the UK was imminently at threat from weapons of mass destruction 
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(WMD) held by Saddam Hussein, were exacerbated by a report by Andrew Gilligan on the 
BBC Today programme which alleged that intelligence documents presented as evidence of 
this threat had been largely fabricated, or at the very least ‘sexed-up’ for the purpose of 
justifying the invasion to the public. Moreover, ten years after the defeat of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, no weapons of mass destruction have yet been located and few would now 
hold to the argument that they ever existed in the first place. The alleged suicide of Dr David 
Kelly, purportedly as a result of his being outed as the senior government scientist who was 
the source of Gilligan’s report, led to the Hutton enquiry which ultimately castigated the BBC 
while leaving the Government exonerated, but did nothing to counter public opinion which 
remained largely cynical of the WMD claim, and the legitimacy of the Government’s course 
of action. 
 
The Tricycle Theatre in London was at the heart of a resurgence of verbatim and 
documentary theatre that arose in response to the events following 9/11, including  Richard 
Norton-Taylor’s Justifying War (2003) – a dramatisation of the Hutton Inquiry into the death 
of Dr David Kelly, Norton-Taylor’s Called to Account – The Indictment of Anthony Charles 
Lynton Blair for the Crime of Aggression against Iraq – A Hearing (2007) and Victoria 
Brittain and Gillian Slovo’s Guantanamo: Honor Bound to Defend Freedom (2004) – 
constructed from interviews with British citizens who had been imprisoned without trial in 
America’s infamous Guantanamo Bay. David Hare's 'Stuff Happens' (2004) - produced by the 
National Theatre, Robin Soans's Talking to Terrorists (2005) - commissioned by Out of Joint, 
Steve Gilroy’s Motherland (2009) and the National Theatre of Scotland’s Black Watch 
(2006) also used verbatim techniques to dramatise issues arising from the British invasion of 
Iraq and subsequent events.  
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A further on-going consequence of Blair’s complicity in Bush’s ‘war on terror’, was the 
growing hostility of the Muslim diaspora to the West’s, arguably unjustified and illegal, 
military intervention in the Middle East. Tensions between Islam and the West did not begin 
with 9/11 rather the attacks were, in part, one result of long-standing tensions, most notably 
the West’s support of Israel in the long-running conflict over Israel’s occupation of 
Palestinian territory. Nevertheless, it has been claimed by many commentators that the 
retaliatory action of Bush and Blair supported the growth of al-Qaeda and related terrorist 
cells better than any recruitment campaign bin Laden could have devised, particularly in light 
of ensuing scandals such as the Abu Ghraib images, where American soldiers posed for 
photographs with Iraqi prisoners forced to adopt humiliating and degrading positions. In 
February 2003, one month before the Iraq invasion, the Joint Intelligence Committee warned 
the Government that ‘al Qa’eda and associated groups continued to represent by far the 
greatest terrorist threat to Western interests, and that threat would be heightened by military 
action against Iraq’ (Jones 2003 in Hewitt, 2008, 77) and it has been calculated that there was 
‘a sevenfold increase in worldwide terrorism in the four years following March 2003’ 
(Hewitt, 2008, 5). In 2004 a Joint Foreign Office / Home Office report, ‘Young Muslims and 
Extremism’ cited the double standards of Western foreign policy, the bias for Israel in the on-
going dispute over Palestinian territories and the recent ‘war on terror’ as core grievances that 
underpinned a growing hostility to Western governments, even when these governments were 
their own (Hewitt, 2008, 78). Consequently, it is difficult to dismiss a causal link between the 
invasion of Iraq and the terrorist attacks that subsequently occurred in Madrid (2004), 
London (2005) and Glasgow (2007). One of the London bombers, indeed, made the link 
explicit in his posthumous video posting on the Arabic news channel Al Jazeera. 
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The London bombings on 7 July 2005, later explored in Simon Stephens’s play Pornography 
(2008), were unprecedented and unanticipated. The Government’s anti-terror legislation had 
been targeted pre-dominantly at foreign nationals, and on 6 July the head of MI5 had assured 
a group of Labour MPs that no imminent terror attacks were on the horizon.  London was 
celebrating the news that it had been chosen to host the 2012 Olympic games when, at 
8.50am, three bombs exploded at different points on the London Underground, the fourth 
later detonated on a crowded bus passing through Tavistock Square at 9.47am. In total there 
were fifty two deaths and over 700 people injured, many seriously. All four bombers were 
British citizens from British Muslim communities, who had launched an indiscriminatory 
suicide attack on their own people.   
 
After the attacks of 11 September, and reinforced by the subsequent London bombings, the 
figure of the terrorist, in the popular imagination, became increasingly synonymous with the 
Muslim identity, a conflation that was enhanced by the media, the security forces and, 
arguably, the government to the significant detriment of community and race relations in the 
UK.  The growing suspicion of multiculturalism, with specific regard to Islam, was, of 
course, already well established by this point in time, as most infamously proposed in Samuel 
Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis which claimed that the values of Islam and the 
values of the Western World were fundamentally incompatible (Huntington, 1993). The 
sense, within the UK, that the narrative of multiculturalism was being re-written as ‘solving 
the problem’ of Islam, became more acute following the riots in Bradford, Burnley and 
Oldham in 2001, when the focus turned onto the alleged ‘self-segregation’ of Muslim 
communities, rather than any attempt to address the well-documented discrimination and 
disadvantage such communities were facing.  As Charles Husband and Yunis Alam make 
clear in their study ‘Social Cohesion and Counter Terrorism’, the riots were in large part 
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understood by those in power as the result of a ‘collective failure’ on the part of the Muslim 
communities ‘to embrace their ”Britishness”’ (Husband and Alam, 2011, 3).  
 
After 9/11 there came new legislation in the form of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act 2001, in which the Government proposed draconian new powers for detaining 
international terrorist suspects without charge, much like the Americans were able to do 
inside the infamous Guantanamo Bay. The Terrorism Act 2006 swiftly supplanted its 2005 
predecessor as the Government responded to the threat of home-grown terrorism evoked by 
the London bombings, and proposed, among other measures, that the police could now hold 
terrorist suspects for up to ninety days without trial. This proposal was eventually overturned 
in the worst Government defeat since 1978 in favour of a twenty eight day compromise that 
was still double the previous maximum, and quadruple the seven day maximum in place prior 
to the Terrorism Act 2000 (Hewitt, 2008, 55). Days into Gordon Brown’s taking up of the 
Labour leadership in June 2007, Kafeel Ahmed, who later set himself alight, and Bilal 
Abdulla, a diabetes specialist at the Royal Alexandra hospital in Paisley, drove a car bomb 
into the passenger terminal of Glasgow International Airport in an attempted terrorist attack, 
following their previous failed car bomb attempts in London early that month. Brown then 
continued the swathe of Labour’s anti-terrorist legislation by swiftly proposing new 
legislation that would, among other things, create a border police force, and renew the 
government’s attempts to further double the duration of the detention without charge period 
from twenty eight to fifty six days. The impact of Labour’s counter-terrorism agenda on 
Muslim communities throughout the UK in this period was to be far reaching and, arguably, 
counter-productive, as I return to later in this chapter. 
 
The Age of Austerity 
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If 11 September 2001 marked the first Millennial moment when events in America 
sparked off a catastrophic chain of global events, then 15 September 2008 could be 
characterised as the second.  When Lehman Brothers went into liquidation, the global 
banking crisis, already foreshadowed by the nationalisation of Northern Rock (UK) and 
the rescue of Bear Stearns (US) earlier that year, was now inevitable. Loans lent to 
those unable to pay them back had been sold from bank to bank around the world, 
traded in ‘the belief ... that these collateralised securities offered high returns at 
minimal risk. The belief was that not all mortgage borrowers would default at the same 
time. That belief was wrong.’ (Elliot and Treanor, 2013) As Lord Turner, who took 
over as chairman of the Financial Services Authority in the UK concluded, ‘we had 
created a system by 2006 with such a build up of debt that it was inherently unstable, 
and that was going to produce a massive crisis’ (Eliot and Treanor, 2013). On the 7 
October 2008 the Chancellor, Alistair Darling, took a phone call from Sir Tom 
McKillop, chairman of the Royal Bank of Scotland, telling him that within two to three 
hours the bank was going to run out of cash, and would have to cease trading by the end 
of the day (Eliot and Treanor, 2013). RBS and Lloyds proved to be too big to fail, and 
were bailed out by the Government and are still, at the time of writing, being paid for 
by the British tax payer. The banking collapse was followed by the credit crunch; banks 
refusing, or unable, to lend, and businesses starved of cash. As businesses began to fail, 
unemployment began to rise and the economy began to plummet, and there were real 
fears that the Great Depression following the Wall Street Crash of 1929 might be 
repeated. While this was ultimately averted, in significant parts of Europe the impact of 
the banking crisis was not so far removed from that caused by the slump in the 1930s. 
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For it was not only businesses that were no longer able to borrow the finance they 
required. National governments had long enjoyed low interest rates and had borrowed 
heavily over the boom years, building up significant levels of national debt. In this new 
age of austerity and uncertainty, it became clear that these debt levels were so high in 
certain countries and the economy now so weak, that there was a risk that they could 
never be repaid. This was the sovereign debt crisis that hit the Eurozone in 2009, with 
first Greece, and subsequently, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus requiring bail outs 
from the European Union to save them from national bankruptcy and the ultimate 
collapse of the Euro. Conditions in the UK never reached the degree of economic and 
humanitarian crisis experienced in these countries, but the Tory-led Coalition, elected 
in 2010, took their opportunity to impose severe, and many believed substantively 
ideological, fiscal cuts on government spending, ostensibly designed to reduce the 
country’s deficit and maintain its credit-rating and financial credibility. Swathing cuts 
to public services included the decimation of local authorities and local government 
funding; the withdrawal of government subsidy for university fees; and sweeping cuts 
to welfare and disability benefits as well as to Arts Council budgets. While Education, 
along with the NHS, was ring-fenced from direct cuts, initiatives that had been 
introduced by Labour, such as the Educational Maintenance Allowance to enable those 
from poorer backgrounds to be supported in post-sixteen education, were axed. 
Educational support services and social care, provided in the main by local authorities, 
suffered severely. Given the spending restraints they were now under, many local 
authorities withdrew significant amounts of funding previously spent on the arts that 
were now required to plug the gap to enable them to continue to offer essential services 
in social care, and basic urban maintenance. Newcastle and Nottingham were two city 
councils that were driven to publically threaten the withdrawal of one hundred per cent 
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of their arts spending to balance budgets elsewhere. The knock on impact of such cuts 
across the UK was the closure of libraries and other cultural and leisure centres, the 
retrenchment of urban regeneration projects and local participatory arts projects, and a 
reduction in the levels of match funding required for Arts Council support for regional 
theatres and companies.  
 
The banking crisis, and the austerity politics that prioritised deficit reduction over the 
maintenance of essential public services, inspired a whole new wave of global radical 
activist protest, unseen at this level of visibility for at least a generation.  On Saturday 
17 September 2011, five thousand Americans set up a semi-permanent protest camp in 
a park on Liberty Street, as close as they could get to their symbolic target of Wall 
Street that had been barricaded by police. By October, the occupation was being 
replicated in forty seven US states, and similar protests in Canada, the UK, Germany 
and Sweden were in the planning (McVeigh, 2011). On 15 October it was claimed that 
more than nine hundred and fifty protests were being held in over eighty countries, 
including Rome, Sydney and Madrid, and the Occupy London movement gathered 
outside St Paul’s Cathedral, ready to march to occupy the London Stock Exchange 
(Batty, 2011). In the event they found their way barred, and so set up camp outside St 
Pauls’ Cathedral, calling for systemic change to the financial system, on behalf of ‘the 
ninety nine per cent’ who were currently being failed by it. On 18 January the City of 
London finally won its court case to evict the protestors and by the end of February 
2012 the camp was gone. But not before it had caused the resignation of both the Canon 
and the Dean of St Paul’s Cathedral, who felt their positions had become untenable in 
light of the Church’s own public statements on the immorality of the global banking 
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system, which seemed irreconcilable with the state’s constant threat of forcible removal 
of the protestors on behalf of St Pauls. 
 
The occupy movement was possibly the first globally co-ordinated protest movement to 
benefit from the developments in social media technology, and similar direct-action 
campaigns against tax-evading multi-national corporations such as Starbucks and 
Amazon, have been likewise co-ordinated by civil disobedience organisations such as 
UK Uncut since the economic crisis in 2008. A new wave of environmental activism 
was also mounted against the multinational oil corporations awarded fracking contracts 
in parts of the UK where reserves had been identified, including Lancashire, Scotland, 
South Wales, Sussex and Kent. The protestors argued that not only would fracking 
increase our reliance on fossil fuels that were responsible for rising carbon emissions, 
but it was a method of extraction that threatened significant local environmental 
disturbance including devastation of landscapes, air pollution and water contamination.  
 
This resurgence of political activism is also evident in theatre, although not always 
undertaken by theatre companies, as would have been the case in the alternative theatre 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s. This current generation of artists tend to commit to 
political action as individuals within more loosely-based collectives, perhaps as a direct result 
of the ways in which company identities and bodies of work have been co-opted into the 
capitalist marketplace of the Creative Industries as earlier described. The most high profile 
example of such collectivist practice is Theatre Uncut, which was formed in 2010 as a direct 
response to the ‘brutal cuts in public spending’. Theatre Uncut requests protest plays from 
well-known playwrights (the 2013 event included work from Tanika Gupta, Neil LaBute, 
Tim Price and Mark Thomas) to be made available for public performances within a limited 
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period of time. This creates a Theatre Uncut mass action event each year with the plays 
performed simultaneously around the world; predominantly in the UK, continental Europe 
and North America, but with some reaching as far as Africa, South America and Australia. 
  
Discrimination and Equal Rights 
Improving the quality of life for people with disabilities was high on New Labour’s social 
agenda. John Major’s Government had already introduced the Disability Discrimination Act 
in 1995, an act which was amended in 2005, following Labour’s earlier establishment of the 
Disability Rights Commission, extension of the definition of disability and introduction of ‘a 
public duty to promote disabled people’s equality’ and ‘involve disabled people in decision 
making’ (Close, 2011, 13). In 2010 the UK Government ratified the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities, and passed the single Equality Act 
which covered characteristics including ‘age, disability, gender reassignment, pregnancy and 
maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation’ (Government Equalities Office, 
2010, 3). New Labour’s commitment to raising levels of participation for people with 
disabilities led to a raft of arts funding being prioritised for theatre companies working with 
disabled artists and audiences, as I outline in more detail later in the chapter. In 2003, the 
European Year of Disabled People, the Labour Government allocated two million pounds to 
promote partnerships and activities designed to raise awareness of disability issues, many of 
which were arts-based. A period that was characterised by the growing visibility of disabled 
artists, and growing public awareness of disability rights, culminated in the 2012 
Paralympics, but this potential high-point of progress was already undermined by mass 
protests and rallies against the increasingly brutal welfare cuts and ‘fit for work’ regime (soon 
to be joined by the ‘bedroom tax’), imposed by the Coalition Government: austerity policies 
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that were disproportionately devastating to the lives of those with disabilities and long-term 
physical and mental illness. 
 
However, unquestionable progress in equality legislation during this period was made in the 
recognition of greater rights for the gay community and significantly increased levels of public 
tolerance for homosexual partnerships, lifestyles and parenthood. The first gay pride events took 
place in Manchester 1990, and Brighton and London in1992, and in 1994 the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act reduced the age of consent for male homosexual sex from twenty one to 
eighteen, reducing it finally to sixteen in 2001. Reversing the homophobic trend of the Thatcher 
years, the controversial Clause 28 of the Local Government Act 1988 was repealed by Labour in 
England and Wales in 2003, with the equivalent already having been taken off Scottish statute 
books in 2000. In 2004 the Civil Partnership Act was passed, giving same-sex couples equivalent 
legal rights to married couples, and in 2013, a Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Bill was introduced 
to both UK and Scottish Parliaments, making lesbian and gay rights in Britain ‘among the best in 
Europe’ (Park and Rhead, 2013, 14-15). Consequently, the politically activist gay theatre 
companies of the 1970s and 1980s are not much in evidence in this period, and the gay presence 
within the independent theatre environment tends towards the exploration or celebration of queer 
culture, rather than the political argument for its legitimation, with venues such as the Drill Hall, 
companies such as Duckie, and festivals such as Glasgow’s Glasgay and Manchester’s Queer Up 
North, platforming artists from across the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender) 
Community and beyond, with an emphasis on queer and transgressive performance including a 
rise in the popularity of neo-burlesque. 
 
Race Relations and Cultural Tensions in the UK 
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Following the Metropolitan Police’s gross mismanagement of the investigation of the murder 
of black teenager Stephen Lawrence in 1993, the Macpherson Report was commissioned by 
the Blair Government and published in 1999. Macpherson’s inquiry concluded that 
institutional racism had been at the heart of the investigation, and could be defined as 
 
the collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional 
service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen 
or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviours which amount to discrimination 
through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping 
which disadvantage minority ethnic people. (Macpherson, 1999, paragraph 6.34) 
 
Subsequently the Race Relations Amendment Act (2000) required a pro-active 
approach on the part of all public organisations and services to ensure that they were 
fully complicit with a commitment to the eradication of racism, however implicit, 
‘invisible’, or unintentional that racism might be. This legislation, and the spirit behind 
it, had a significant effect on arts organisations as I shall later detail, in that it obliged 
them to put race and diversity at the forefront of their artistic policies.  
 
Racist discourse within wider society, as Chris Allen argues, tended to shift over the 
period of this study, from an emphasis on race and colour, as had been the case in the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s, to an emphasis on race and religion which became much more 
publically explicit and visible, and was often justified with recourse to grounds of 
reasoned cultural difference as opposed to irrational prejudice (Allen, 2005). Even 
within traditionally liberal contexts such as the Independent and Guardian newspapers, 
criticism of Islam, often from feminist, libertarian or secular positions, was socially 
27 
 
tolerated, or even supported (Allen, 2005, 61). For some, such as Allen, this was racism 
hiding under liberal colours; for others, it was vital defence of the right to free speech 
and the right to oppose cultural traditions that were at odds with your own belief 
systems, without fear of being called a racist for so doing.  
 
In the wider theatre context similar tensions were exposed. In 2004 Birmingham Rep pulled 
their production of Bhetzi (Dishonour), written by the young female Sikh 
playwright, Gurpreet Kaur Bhatti, following an evacuation of the theatre in the face of violent 
protests by the Sikh community who were incensed by the play’s depiction of rape and 
violence in a gurdwara, a Sihk place of workship. Artists almost unanimously condemned the 
closure of the play as cowardice and capitulation to censorship of the mob, with 700 
signatures endorsing a letter of protest, including those of Southbank director Jude Kelly and 
Richard Eyre. The Christian rallies and protests that greeted the BBC’s screening of Jerry 
Springer – The Opera (2005), and dogged the subsequent theatre tour, were also often 
couched in terms that suggested the militancy of Islamic and Sikh groups had galvanised a 
traditionally less vocal religious community into action. To cite Stephen Green, national 
director of Christian Voice, ‘If this show portrayed Mohammed or Vishnu as homosexual, 
ridiculous and ineffectual, it would never have seen the light of day’ (BBC, 2005).  
 
Despite the theatre community’s condemnation of Birmingham Rep, there was 
nevertheless a notable absence of plays that directly challenged religious 
fundamentalism in the name of free speech. One notable exception was the theatre 
company DV8 who produced two courageous and highly critical pieces of work, To be 
Straight with You (2007) and Can we talk about this (2011). The first addressed the 
high, and often fatal, extent of homophobia within fundamentalist African/Asian 
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Christian and Muslim communities, the second addressed the murder and persecution 
of individuals who had been seen to commit offence by their representations of Islam in 
artistic material. In both cases the company explicitly charged its audience with 
cowardice in permitting prejudice and censorship rather than risking being castigated as 
racist. 
 
Community Cohesion 
In 2011, the worst riots in thirty years erupted in London, Birmingham, Liverpool, 
Nottingham, Manchester and Salford, with public order temporarily suspended as 
police struggled to deal with thousands of youths on the rampage, and the Army were 
placed on alert to intervene. The riots were initially seen as a response to the shooting 
of Mark Duggan, a young black man who was killed by a Metropolitan police officer 
who mistakenly thought he was armed, and austerity politics were also widely 
considered to have played their part, but a study undertaken by the Guardian and the 
London School of Economics evidenced that a more widespread anger against the 
police, and in particular their day-to-day treatment of black and Asian communities, 
was a much more significant factor (Prasad, 2011).   
 
This would be borne out by Steve Hewitt’s report that within a nine month period in 2006, 
‘22,700 stops [and searches] led to 27 terrorism-related arrests and the Metropolitan Police 
Authority described the counter-terrorist programme as doing “untold damage” to community 
relations’ (Hewitt, 2008, 113). The shooting of Jean Charles de Menezez the day after a failed 
attempt by would-be terrorists to mimic the London bombings on 21 July 2005, had done 
nothing to instil confidence. De Menezez was a Brazilian plumber, with no terrorist 
connections, who was mistaken for a suicide bomber and shot dead by armed police in a 
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London tube station. In attempts to alleviate this ‘untold damage’ to community relations, the 
on-going project of community cohesion, galvanised by the 2001 riots and ensuing inner city 
disturbances such as the Lozells riots in Birmingham in 2005, was now reined into service as 
a key strand of the counter-terrorism strategy, published in 2006.  
 
The need to engage Muslim communities in, what were strategically and ideologically 
defined as ‘shared values’, and to ‘assimilate’ them into social arenas that were multi, rather 
than mono, cultural, became one of the key targets of the community cohesion agenda, and 
one which was to have a notable impact on arts policy, as will be described later in the 
chapter. There were significant concerns around certain aspects of this agenda that are worth 
highlighting here in their wider social context. Firstly, assimilation was always conceived as 
a one way street. Community cohesion was less about all communities finding common 
ground and establishing shared values by mutual compromise and tolerance, and much more 
about specific communities (Muslims) adopting cultural practices and values that were 
authorised by the Government as desirable and British. As Husband and Alam succinctly 
paraphrase, ‘[f]or members of the British Muslim population the message of Community 
Cohesion appeared to be: We want you to be more actively engaged as citizens, but we want 
you to be more like us’ (Husband and Alam, 2011, 3). Secondly, the shift from New Labour’s 
earlier emphasis on ‘social cohesion’ to one on ‘community cohesion’ resulted, as proposed 
in the Cantle Report, in a move away from addressing socio-economic factors and social 
class, to one focused on ‘identifiable communities defined by faith or ethnicity’(Cantle, 2008, 
50). As such, the issues of economic disadvantage underlying many inner-city Muslim 
communities were side-lined as potential causes of tension. De-segregation, as Kalra and 
Kapoor observe in their report, was now less about promoting material equality and more 
about removing cultural difference, a significant departure from the aims of the multicultural 
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project in Britain up to this time (in Husband and Alam, 2011, 55). The ideological basis of 
the community cohesion project ensured that when Government funding was made available 
to promote wider access to cultural activities for black, Asian and minority ethnic 
communities, it was done so with the clear understanding that only the ‘right kind’ of cultural 
development should be supported. As Communities Secretary Ruth Kelly announced in 2006, 
only those Muslim groups who were seen to be ‘taking a pro-active leadership role in 
tackling extremism and defending our shared values’ could expect to receive funding for their 
activities (Hewitt, 2008, xxi). As Spalek and Lambert have argued 
 
It appears that government projects aimed at fostering dialogue and community 
participation tend to be underpinned by broader questions and debates around 
what sort of Muslim identities should be encouraged in the UK… and what kinds 
of Muslim identities should be actively discouraged and/or suppressed. (Spalek 
and Lambert, 2008, 261) 
 
Surveillance, Digital Developments and New Technologies 
The counter-terrorist agenda heralded in a raft of measures which were to infringe the civil 
liberties of those beyond, as well as within, Muslim communities. The action group, Liberty, 
highlight as particularly concerning, the frequent use of ‘section 44 of the Terrorism Act 
2000 allowing stop and search without suspicion which has been disproportionately used 
against peaceful protestors and ethnic minority groups’; the ‘banning of non-violent political 
organisations’; and ‘the dangerously broad definition of terrorism’ (Liberty, 2013). Identity 
cards were proposed in 2005 on the back of the London bombings but, despite Blair’s best 
efforts, were never introduced, and the scheme was eventually scrapped by the Coalition 
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Government, probably due to pressure from the Liberal Democrats, in 2010. Surveillance of 
other kinds, however, rose steadily throughout New Labour’s term of office. 
 
According to Professor Clive Norris, in the mid 2000s the British were under surveillance by 
approximately 4.2 million closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras – ‘one for every four 
citizens’, with Londoners picked up on average three hundred times per day (in Marr, 2007, 
580-81). GPS systems in mobile phones and cars could also now easily enable the 
geographical tracking of their users. In June 2013, The Guardian published interviews it had 
held with Edward Snowden, an employee of defence contractor Booz Allen Hamilton at 
America’s National Security Agency, which drew from internal NSA documents suggesting 
that the agency had ‘direct access’ to data held on millions of private citizens by Google, 
Facebook, Apple and other US internet providers (Gidda, 2013). Snowden was immediately 
charged with espionage by the US Government who demanded his extradition, but he was 
granted temporary asylum in Russia. Snowden’s initial leaks were followed by revelations in 
the autumn of 2013 that the NSA routinely spied on its European allies, collecting tens of 
millions of European phone records, including those of Germany’s Chancellor Angela 
Merkel. The NSA countered that the European data had been collated by NATO, and that 
security agencies in Europe were fully complicit with the practice, despite the denials of their 
leaders. 
  
The developments in new technology, however, could work both ways. The website 
Wikileaks, established by Julian Assange and launched in 2006, has established a reputation 
for publishing high level secret documents from government and security organisations, that 
the public were never intended to see. Most famously the site released hundreds of thousands 
of secret US military logs detailing its operations in Iraq and posted a video showing a US 
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Apache helicopter killing Iraqi civilians and journalists during an attack in Baghdad in July 
2007. Wikileaks has also revealed ‘a report on toxic waste dumping on the Ivory Coast, 
Church of Scientology manuals, Guantanamo Bay detention camp procedures and material 
involving large banks such as Kaupthing and Julius Baer, among other documents’ (Hiscock, 
2013). Like Snowden, Julian Assange is wanted by the US for espionage, and has been living 
within the Ecuadorian Embassy in London since June 2012. 
 
It was 1991 when Tim Berners-Lee, celebrated in the London Olympics Opening Ceremony, 
launched the world –wide-web browser that was going to change global structures of 
communication from that point on. By 1995 internet shopping on ebay and amazon had 
already begun for a limited market, in 1998 Google was founded, and by 2000 forty per cent 
of Britons had accessed the internet at some time. By 2003 nearly half of British homes were 
connected and by 2006 seventy five per cent of British children had internet access at home 
(Marr, 2007, 573). The first ever smartphone was launched in 1994 and in 2001 Apple’s iPod 
was born. Both of these items of technology were to have real impact on performance 
practice over the first decade of the twenty first century, as companies began to experiment 
with audio soundtracks where iPods were provided for the audience and interactive models of 
performance where mobile phones were increasingly assumed to be something that every 
spectator would be carrying. 
 
In 2005 the Facebook Social Networking Site was launched, a site which grew to boast more 
than a billion users each year and was valued at more than 104 billion dollars when sold on 
the stock market only seven years later (Guardian, 2012). YouTube was also created in 2005, 
and in 2006 the micro-blogging service Twitter was launched. The advent of social 
networking media, and open access documentation sites such as YouTube, were to change 
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the face of marketing for cultural activity, especially once websites became easy for anyone 
to create, and digital stills and films could be shot from mobile phones and downloaded 
directly to websites and YouTube. Where theatre companies had previously required 
professional designers, photographers and technical resources to focus on press releases, 
flyers and posters, it was now all about spreading the word virally online, getting information 
and links to promotional footage to vast networks of people at the push of a button, and 
cultivating an on-line presence, with friends and followers numbering in the thousands 
through constant posting and sharing of news and information. Online blogging, made more 
accessible to large numbers of readers by the advent of Twitter and Facebook, has also 
significantly changed patterns of reception for performance work, with many blogs such as 
those by Matt Trueman and Jake Orr now established and respected as sites of theatre 
criticism that are given at least equal weight to the more traditional critical reviews in the 
broadsheet media.   
 
The advent of social media also further enhanced the growing appetite for self-promotion and 
voyeurism that had underpinned reality TV shows like Big Brother (2000-) which had first 
appeared on Channel 4 in 2000; formats described by Richard Kilborn as amalgamating 
‘game-show, talk-show and peep-show elements while retaining vestiges of the observational 
documentary’ (Kilborn, 2003, 12).  The cynicism engendered by the ubiquity of reality TV 
and talent shows such as The X Factor, permeates the cultural zeitgeist of the 2000s, also 
notable in films pre-empting the period such as The Truman Show (1998) and The Blair 
Witch Project (1999), and is reflected in the deconstructions of ‘the real’ that underpin the 
sceptical postmodern aesthetic of many companies in this period including Forced 
Entertainment, Stan’s Cafe and Desperate Optimists to name only a few.  
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The digital economy had been promoted by New Labour throughout the creative industries, 
both for its capacity to generate significant levels of income, and for its automatic claim to 
‘innovation’ that is a by-product of all technological development. Seen as vital to the future 
of theatre from one of its earliest policy appearances in the Boyden report (2000), by 2008 it 
featured in the Arts Council’s manifesto ‘Great Art for Everyone’ as one of four development 
priorities for the next three year period. 2009 saw the launch of NTLive, which enabled 
filmed versions of National Theatre productions to be screened live in cinemas around the 
country, and in 2012 the online resource ‘The Space’ was developed by a partnership of the 
Arts Council and the BBC, providing free and on-demand access (via computers, tablets, 
smartphones and connected TV) ‘ to the work of some of the UK’s greatest artists and arts 
organisations – including full performances and premieres, original commissions and rare 
archive material’ (ACE, 2013, 18). 
 
Part Two: Arts Councils, Funding and Policy 
Grant-in-Aid Funding 1994-1997 
In 1993 the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB) had pre-empted political devolution and 
set out its plan to dissolve itself into its national constituents. From 1994, the Scottish and 
Welsh Arts Councils, which had up until then been sub-committees of the ACGB, became 
independent bodies with their own Royal Charters to be funded by the Scottish and Welsh 
Offices. In Wales this also resulted in the merger of the new Welsh Arts Council with Wales’ 
existing three regional arts associations to form one single Arts Council of Wales / Cyngor 
Celfyddydau Cymru. Art in England would now be funded, under a new Royal Charter, by a 
newly established Arts Council for England. 
 
35 
 
For all three countries, the final years of the long-standing Tory Government were 
characterised, in financial terms, by the effects of the recession. The first cut to the ACGB in 
1992/93 was initially of two per cent, and by 1997 the Arts Council of England (ACE) was 
reporting a cut in real terms, over the previous four years, of nine per cent (Allen, 1997, 8). 
Not only were the Government cutting their grant contribution to ACE for the first time since 
the Arts Council’s formation in 1946, but local authority partnership funding, sponsorship 
and earned revenue were also falling due to the economic effects of recession. In a policy 
document published in 1996 it was estimated that there had been a thirty two per cent real 
terms reduction in sponsorship and donations income between 1986/87 and 1994/95. The 
same document reported that ‘the persistent real-terms increase in average ticket yields at 
building-based repertory theatres – up 37% between 1986/87 and 1993/94 - went into reverse 
in 1994/95’, showing a real-terms reduction of six per cent (ACE, 1996, 3). 
 
Despite having to endure the same dismal financial climate, with the re-organisation of local 
authorities and steep decreases in local government funding for the arts causing particular 
headaches in the Welsh and Scottish contexts, independence from the ACGB meant that, 
unlike their English counterparts, the Arts Council of Wales (ACW) received a small increase 
in funding at this time, and the Scottish Arts Council (SAC) grant was at least held at a 
standstill. Over the same period of 1986/87 to 1997/98 spending on drama as an art form in 
both Scotland and Wales actually enjoyed an eighteen per cent rise, compared with a thirty 
eight per cent fall in England (ACE, 2000a, 33-5). There were few new franchises offered to 
English theatre companies over this period, due to the dire funding situation, but companies 
to buck the trend included motiroti, The Right Size, Open Hand Theatre Company, David 
Glass Ensemble and Graeae Theatre. In Scotland, a number of new companies were funded to 
apply for fixed term touring funding in 1997, out of which Suspect Culture and Boilerhouse 
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were successful, at the expense of the long-standing Wildcat from which revenue funding 
was removed. There was very little movement in Welsh theatre over this period, with Theatre 
West Glamorgan joining other Theatre-in Education (TIE) companies for regular funding in 
1995/96, and no other significant gains or losses.   
 
The National Lottery 
In the economic climate of the mid-1990s, the potential of the National Lottery, introduced 
by John Major in 1993, was heralded as no less than the saviour of the arts.  Funding from the 
Lottery was to come on stream in 1995; the money to be raised from the public’s purchase of 
lottery tickets to be split among five good causes: Art, Charity, Heritage, Millennium Projects 
and Sport, with the Art component to be administered by the Arts Councils. The financial 
impact of the Lottery, more than doubling arts funding in its first full year of operation, can 
be seen by a quick comparison. By 1995/96, the arts Lottery fund of £255.4 million was 
already exceeding the Arts Council of England’s Government grant of £191.1 million. By 
1997/98 the Lottery funds had increased to £297.6 million, while the Government grant had 
fallen to £185.1 million.  In 1995/96 SAC’s government grant stood at £24.5 million 
alongside Lottery income of £27.3 million. By 1997/98 the Lottery funds totalled 
£32.5million in comparison with government grant in aid of £27.1million. ACW received 
£14.2million in government grants in 1995/96 alongside Lottery income of £15.3million. By 
1997/98 the figures were £14.5 (government) and £17.8 (lottery) (ACE, 2000a, 43). No 
surprise that in the 1996 annual report the Chair of ACE reported nothing less than a ‘cultural 
revolution’ (Gowrie, 1996, 6).   
 
For the independent theatre companies the impact of lottery funding was somewhat delayed 
by the terms the Arts Councils themselves had requested. With good reason, given the 
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economic climate and public spending cuts of the time, the Arts councils, and arts community 
in general, had foreseen a danger that lottery funds would be seized on a replacement, not an 
addition, to statutory funding of the arts. To prevent this, and protect the principle of core 
statutory funding, lottery proceeds could not be used to fund what was described as ‘core’ 
activity, but must work on the principle of what became known as ‘additionality’. This meant 
that the lottery could not pay for the running costs and ongoing primary activities of 
companies, but only projects and resources that could be defined as ‘additional’ to those core 
costs and activities. Consequently, in the first instance, lottery funds for the arts were 
restricted to capital – mainly building - projects, and were not able to be used for revenue, 
thus effectively preventing the funds from having any significant impact on the level of arts 
activity itself, which continued to struggle for survival under the public spending cuts and 
general economic downturn.  
 
However, by 1996 the paradoxical vision of gleaming new buildings with declining numbers 
of artists to fill them, or companies to run them, was becoming apparent. The Arts Councils 
entered into conversations with the Secretary of State for the Department of National 
Heritage, Virginia Bottomley, to discuss how a percentage of lottery funds might be shifted 
from capital spend to artistic development and content, albeit practice that could still be 
defined as ‘additional’ to the core activities of the company. The subsequent lottery funded 
schemes including Arts for Everyone (A4E), A4E Express, Awards for All and the Regional 
Arts Lottery Programme (RALP) had much to offer the independent theatre sector. Their 
objectives (new audiences, increased participation in the arts, skills development, youth 
projects and new work) were perfectly suited to the development, not only of artistic practice 
rather than buildings, but of new and experimental artistic practice and new approaches to 
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audience, access and participation which situated independent theatre companies as perfectly 
placed recipients for the new money.  
 
Of greatest impact on the future of the independent theatre ecology was the introduction of 
the A4E Express scheme which was targeted at small organisations who could bid for up to 
five thousand pounds. In its first two rounds the A4E Express delivered twenty one million 
pounds to over five thousand small projects (FitzHerbert and Paterson, 1998, 46). As a result, 
there was to be an explosion of new theatre companies across Britain who were benefitting 
from funds which were both significantly greater, and significantly easier to win than 
anything that had previously been available for start up companies from the Regional Arts 
Boards or National Arts Councils. As FitzHerbert and Paterson confirm, ‘projects that met 
the criteria and the necessary technicalities were accepted pretty much on the spot’ 
(FitzHerbert and Paterson, 1998, 46).  
 
The impact of the lottery went further than funding an explosion of new work, it also, to 
some degree, began to shape what that new work might be. Certainly for the main 
programme, the criteria outlined by the A4E application form encouraged projects to be 
designed with a distinctly greater emphasis on widening audience, access and participation 
than had previously been the case with Arts Council funding. This can be seen in the nature 
of the work of the companies who were among the first beneficiaries of generous lottery 
awards. Mind the Gap (£302,050) and Strathcona Theatre (£396,797) were both companies 
supporting people and artists with disabilities; Cardboard Citizens (£253, 754) focused on 
working with and for homeless people;  Tara Arts (£605,534) were a leading Asian theatre 
company, and Pop Up Theatre (£220,218) and Pegasus Theatre (£222, 239) both produced 
theatre for young people. Mind the Gap and Strathcona, although funded by the Arts Council 
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under their touring scheme, did not receive core funding, and Cardboard Citizens were not 
funded by the Arts Council at all, so this lottery money, and its particular objectives, can be 
seen to have made a genuine contribution to the existing theatre ecology of the time, both in 
the kind of work that met its particular objectives, and in the degree of funds it could make 
available to support this kind of practice.  
 
Arts Council Policies for Theatre 1995-98 
The Policy for Drama of the English Arts Funding System addressing the crisis in funding for 
drama in England in 1996, offered real seeds of hope for the independent theatre sector in 
subsequent years (ACE, 1996).  Many of its recommendations were picked up and nurtured 
by the Boyden Report (2000) which was written a few years later in a much more auspicious 
period for significant financial investment. Throughout it emphasised the importance of new 
work and new writing for the growth of the theatre ecology in England; it also suggested that 
a shift in emphasis from allocations of funding according to historical precedent to one which 
was more responsive to emerging artistic initiatives might be desirable. Perhaps most 
crucially, for independent touring companies in the following decades, it stressed the 
importance of the development of long term partnerships between companies and venues, as 
the venue’s traditional role as producing house was under strain and could benefit from a 
more mixed economy that included receiving and co-commissioning independent touring 
productions. Many of the additional initiatives which were going to influence the direction of 
arts strategy and impact on the independent theatre sector into the new millennium were also 
proposed here – an emphasis on access, audience development, international exchange, 
diversity and inclusion, and theatre for young people. 
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1993 had seen the publication of two key strategy documents for Scottish Arts, the Charter 
for Arts in Scotland and SAC’s four-year Corporate Plan. In common with the developments 
in England noted above, and in common with emerging arts policy in Wales, there was an 
emphasis on access and education, artist-led innovation, audience development, international 
exchange and the development of partnerships between building-based organisations and 
independent companies, co-productions and a greater sharing of existing resources. Where 
the English strategy’s emphasis on access and greater cultural inclusion predominantly 
focused on the multicultural diversity of its population, in Scotland and Wales, strategies 
highlighted the importance of promoting each nation’s indigenous languages. In Scotland, 
policy was directed towards increasing the momentum for the sustainability of indigenous 
arts, and for greater support to be given to companies working in Scots or Gaelic. One of the 
first outcomes of this initiative, in 1995, was the establishment of an umbrella organisation to 
improve the funding, promotion and development of Fèisean, festivals for young people to 
develop skills in the Gaelic arts of song, dance, drama and traditional music. The 
development of indigenous arts remained a priority in the subsequent corporate plan covering 
1997-2001, leading, among other initiatives, to a commitment to support the newly 
independent Gaelic touring theatre company, TOSG, by offering it revenue funding from 
1999. In Wales, the early initiatives outlined to promote Welsh language theatre took a little 
longer to come to fruition, and were not without controversy, as I will later detail.  
 
The other big question for Scotland at this time was the resurgence of discussions around the 
potential remit and repertoire for a Scottish National Theatre. Before such discussions could 
progress, however, the ongoing issues with the four existing national companies (Scottish 
Ballet, Scottish Opera, Royal Scottish National Orchestra and the Scottish Chamber 
Orchestra) had to be resolved. In 1998, after two years of arduous conflict and mutual 
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hostility, the Scottish Arts Minister, Sam Galbraith, finally released the additional funding 
that had been withheld from the companies, pending their acceptance of significant changes 
in their financing, strategic management and infrastructure. This resulted in an agreement 
whereby, among other things, the companies were obliged to work much more 
collaboratively and share resources more centrally between them. To some degree, this 
emphasis on partnership and collaboration might be seen to lay the ground for the conception 
of the National Theatre that followed; although significantly the model of the National 
Theatre was put forward by the artistic community in the first instance, rather than the 
Scottish Government. Perhaps more portentously, the distrust expressed by the Government 
in the internal management of these organisations can also be seen, with hindsight, as a key 
factor in their decision further down the line to take the national organisations, including the 
new National Theatre, out of the Arts Council’s remit, to answer directly to Government 
ministers. 
 
In 1998, the Federation of Scottish Theatres, representing all the professional theatres in 
Scotland, took the findings of their report into the options for a National Theatre to the 
Scottish Executive. The plan was, as is now widely acknowledged, a radical departure from 
existing models; proposing, not a building-based producing house but, as Robert Leach 
describes, ‘a kind of parallel Arts Council … but with ‘new’ money to promote particular 
productions, and to be controlled by artists rather than bureaucrats’ (Leach, 2007, 173). The 
working group’s proposals were accepted by the Executive and in 2003 the Minister for 
Finance and Public Services was to allocate £7.5 million over two years to develop a National 
Theatre along the lines that had been recommended. The auspicious start to this national 
project, as Leach confirms, was that it ensured that pretty much the entirety of the Scottish 
artistic community ‘was deeply committed from the outset to support a venture which 
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complied with virtually all their ideas’(Leach, 2007,174). Moreover, the collaborative nature 
of the model (with no building of its own partnership was virtually a requirement for each of 
the company’s productions) ensured that a comparatively significant percentage of the four 
million pound annual grant could go directly into artistic costs, rather than overheads. In 
addition, Scotland’s existing theatres and independent companies stood, as it seemed at that 
time, to benefit significantly – in terms of profile, opportunity and economic dividends – 
from the national project that was designed to ‘commission existing theatres and theatre 
companies, or bring together directors, writers, designers, and performers in new 
combinations to create productions that will play in theatres and other venues up and down 
the country’ (Leach, 2007, 174).  
 
English Arts Policy under New Labour  
In the summer of 1998 ACE received its first rise in government grant-in-aid since funds had 
begun to drop in real terms in 1992-93, with an additional £125 million pledged over the 
following three years. The immediate rise to grant-in-aid enabled the Arts Council to go some 
way to re-dressing the crippling five year standstill in core funding which had been imposed 
on regularly funded clients since 1993. In 2000 a further significant spending review took 
place which resulted in a government commitment to subsequent increases to the arts grant-
in-aid budget that would see Treasury spending on the arts rise by ‘an additional £100m a 
year by 2003/04’(ACE, 2000b, 5). Theatre was to be highlighted as one of the three strategic 
priority areas to benefit from the substantial rise in grant-in-aid funding and was allocated an 
additional twenty five million pounds per year, thus taking the total annual spend on theatre 
from forty million in 2000/01 to  seventy million in 2003/04. A second priority of the 
government’s additional funding was to address core funding across all arts organisations, so 
many theatre companies benefitted twice over, with their core funding set to increase by an 
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average of seventeen per cent in 2002/03. Some companies, such as motiroti and Yellow 
Earth Theatre were awarded triple their existing grant allocation and Pilot Theatre for young 
people went from an allocation of £49,300 in 2001/02 to an allocation of £240,000 in 
2002/03. In addition the rise in funding meant that the number of regularly funded 
independent theatre companies rose astronomically from around thirty in 2000/01 to well 
over 100 by 2002/03. 
 
This expansion of the sector was seen as an opportunity for ‘theatre to reinvent itself’ in 
accordance with the National Policy for Theatre, published in 2000 and drawing on the 
Boyden report and the Arts Council’s subsequent response, The Next Stage. While Peter 
Boyden’s report focused on the crisis facing regional repertory theatres, or producing houses, 
it addressed these within an assessment of the theatre ecology as a whole (Boyden, 2000).  In 
the Boyden report we can see the consolidation of the strategic imperatives that were going to 
become a regular feature of arts funding policy in the new Millennium, in particular digital 
experimentation, cultural diversity, grass roots participation and internationalism. One further 
recommendation stands out as being central to the way in which independent companies were 
set to develop. Boyden recommended that producing houses, who were to be the main 
beneficiaries of the additional theatre funding, took on a much more central role in the 
development of independent companies than had previously been the case, thus leading to 
significantly increased support for independent companies in the making and touring of new 
work, as I will discuss further in chapter two.  
 
The additional funding allocated to the sector by the Government did not come without its 
own implicit or explicit ring-fenced directives. Under New Labour the Department of 
National Heritage was re-branded as the Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). 
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The four key themes for the department – access, excellence, education, economic value – 
were precisely replicated in the Arts Council objectives of 1998, and ultimately foregrounded 
the arts under New Labour as serving two primary purposes: firstly their contribution to the 
economic growth area of the creative industries (Smith, 1998, 50), and secondly, their 
contribution to the ‘cross-governmental attack on poverty and social exclusion’ (Smith, 1998, 
139). In line with New Labour’s balancing act between the neo-liberal market and the social-
democratic imperative to address disadvantage, discussed earlier in this chapter, it saw artistic 
practice as likewise serving both agendas. In addition to their economic role within the ‘Cool 
Britannia’ project, the arts were committed, as I will now detail, to support government 
objectives in urban regeneration, reducing unemployment, juvenile crime and social 
delinquency, improving access for young people to culture and education, supporting 
diversity initiatives and greater community cohesion and improving equal rights for 
minorities and those with disabilities. While such aims undoubtedly have merit, they do, as 
Michael McKinnie observes, reduce artistic practice to an instrumentalist role that ‘is wholly 
affirmative. [New Labour’s] policy does not acknowledge that art might be critical, 
subversive, or socially dissonant, conceptions of art which Labour Party policy once thought 
possible, and, to a limited degree, tried to encourage.’(McKinnie, 2004, 188) 
  
In the annual report of 2000, the Arts Council declared that it ‘no longer simply gives out 
money. We now set national policy […]’ (ACE, 2000b, 7). No degree of emphasis in Arts 
Council literature on the ‘arms-length from government’ principle of arts funding could 
disguise the Government’s strategic objectives which were as evident in their increased 
funding of the arts as they were in health, education and all other publically funded services 
during their administration. From 2004 the Arts Council annual reviews were required to 
report against the official requirements of their public service agreement that focused, in 
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particular, on their commitment to increase levels of participation and widen social inclusion 
in the arts. This move towards a more target-driven cultural policy was underpinned by a shift 
in perspective which, from then on, began to frame the public funding of the arts, ‘as an 
“investment” with an anticipated return, as would have been the case with any other industry, 
rather than a “subsidy” offered to some supplicant, grant-dependent entity’ (Ross, 2009, 25). 
In contrast to the message of the outgoing Chairman Lord Gowrie, who invoked Shakespeare 
and Wagner in his conclusion that ‘the high arts have always been subsidised’ (Gowrie, 1998, 
8); the subsequent appointment, Gerry Robinson, the first Chairman under New Labour, is 
clear that from this point on ‘we don’t want to create dependencies: a leg-up from the Arts 
Council will not mean a free ride for life’ (Robinson, 1998, 2). Re-configured as 
‘investment’, public funding could now legitimately have several strings attached, and arts 
organisations under New Labour were rather to be seen as small businesses which could 
support the economy, the education of young people and the social fabric of a multicultural 
society.  
 
Tony Blair’s mantra on the importance of education and opportunities for young people was 
reflected in the Arts Council’s emphasis on provision for this age group – indeed it remained 
a strategic priority beyond New Labour’s term in office, appearing as one of the four strategic 
priorities for the period 2008 to 2011. In the wake of the spending review in 2000, and the 
significant rise in grant-in-aid money allocated to the theatre, the Arts Council committed to a 
fifteen per cent increase in the funding of young people’s companies throughout the country. 
In schools, Creative Partnerships was the flagship programme for New Labour and the Arts 
Council and ran from its conception in 2002 until 2009 when it was finally disbanded as the 
squeeze on public spending began. The scheme placed artists into schools to work with 
teachers and pupils on often long-term projects and provided a significant funding stream for 
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independent theatre companies and freelance artists over this time period. By the end of its 
run it had worked ‘intensively with more than 2,700 schools, with a further 10,000 involved. 
More than 915,000 young people have taken part in over 14,000 sessions.’ (ACE, 2009, 40) 
Creative Partnerships was quintessentially New Labour in its vision. Artists, in this instance, 
were not to teach their artistic practice for its own sake, but to offer schools their creative 
skills and strategies as a means to enhance educational provision across the curriculum, 
raising educational standards by re-engaging children in learning and skills acquisition.  
 
The New Labour Government’s drive for community cohesion, as detailed earlier in this 
chapter, stepped up the Arts Council’s ongoing attempts to establish a much wider ethnic 
diversity amongst the artists that they funded and the audiences for that work. The Black 
Regional Initiative in Theatre (BRIT) was designed to improve the opportunities for the 
national touring of work by black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) artists and gave rise, in 
2002, to the Eclipse Theatre project that focused specifically on middle-scale African 
Caribbean touring theatre, as discussed further in chapter two. Decibel, a showcase platform 
for the work of BAME artists, was first established in 2003, and proved influential in 
introducing promoters, producers, programmers, artistic directors and venue managers to 
BAME work across the country. 
 
Although disability theatre had been active on the fringes since the 1980s with companies 
such as Graeae and Theatre Workshop leading the vanguard, the 1990s and 2000s were to see 
a significant expansion and increase in the profile of such work in line with increased 
funding, changes in political legislation and progressive ideological shifts in public and 
media perception as noted earlier in the chapter. Companies introduced to regular funding in 
2001 included Mind the Gap, New Breed, Heart n Soul, and Full Body and the Voice 
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(renamed Darkhorse in 2012), with Deafinately Theatre brought into the portfolio in 2005. 
Graeae saw its regular funding rise from £115,000 in 1999 to £225,566 in 2001. An even 
wider pool of artists benefitted from a series of showcases over the 2000s designed 
specifically to promote the work of disabled and deaf artists. DaDaFest is an annual showcase 
of disabled and deaf art, supported by the Arts Council and delivered by the North West 
Disability Arts Forum since 2001. The Unlimited Festival at the Southbank Centre was 
established in 2009 as part of the run up to the London Paralympics, and was presented as 
part of the Cultural Olympiad in 2012 featuring not only specialist disability companies such 
as Graeae and Mind the Gap, but also productions featuring deaf and disabled artists, by the 
National Theatres of Wales and Scotland. 
 
The Arts Council’s strategic initiatives in relation to much of the above activity were informed by 
their Public Service Agreement with the Labour Government and their need to meet the targets 
which were set for them as a condition of their receipt of public funds. In 2006 the Arts Council 
Public Service Agreement targets were to ‘increase the proportion of people from priority groups’ 
who took part in, and who attended, arts events. The three priority groups were defined as the 
disabled; black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) communities; and the ‘socially excluded’ 
(those from socio-economic groups C2, D and E). What was clear from the Arts Council’s annual 
reporting on these targets was that something was not working: despite the initiatives highlighted 
above, in the first year (2007) no targets were reached; and black and minority ethnic rates of 
participation and attendance actually went into reverse. By 2009 the final assessment of progress 
against the targets told much the same story, except for one single year when attendance of black, 
Asian and minority ethnic attendance at arts events had shown a slight increase, which the Arts 
Council credited to their Decibel initiative as mentioned above (ACE, 2009, 57). I will return to a 
number of possible reasons for the failure of these targets throughout this and the following 
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chapter. 
 
Scottish Arts Policy after Devolution 
Both the 1999 election and the subsequent 2003 election produced a Scottish Labour-led 
Coalition Government with the Scottish Liberal Democrats. As Gavin Reid notes, in 
comparison with its Westminster counterpart, Holyrood Labour operated less in the ‘post 
Thatcherite realm of markets’ and more in a ‘social democratic and ... nationalist 
environment’ (Reid, 2007, 70). This was not all good news for the arts in terms of spending 
priorities. In defence of why Scottish theatres had not received a comparable funding boost to 
Westminster’s additional £75million, a Scottish Labour Culture Minister retorted that 
‘England did not benefit from free personal care for the elderly, the abolition of university 
tuition fees, or generous teachers’ pay deal’ (Wade 2002 in Reid, 2007, 71). The Executive’s 
National Cultural Strategy, published in 2000, was seen by many, Reid reports, as a ‘missed 
opportunity’ that focused on ‘discussing culture’s role in social policy rather than its 
evaluation’ (Reid, 2007, 72) or simply as ‘dour public-service utilitarianism with art tagged 
onto social policy’ (Reid, 2007,71).  
 
Even more inauspiciously, from the very start of the new Scottish Parliament, the Scottish 
Arts Council’s policies were yoked firmly to the Government’s Cultural Strategy, with Allan 
Wilson, MSP and deputy minister for sport and culture, commenting that he was ‘pleased to 
see how well the Scottish Arts Council’s Plan for 2001/02 ... responds to the priorities set out 
in the [National Cultural] strategy’ (SAC, 2001, 3). The key messages in the Cultural 
Strategy were to improve quality, diversity and inclusiveness, and it was clear that the Arts 
Council were required to help the government deliver objectives in this area in return for a 
49 
 
significant increase in grant-in-aid funding which would amount to more than £150 milllion 
for the arts in Scotland over the subsequent five years. 
 
The Scottish Arts Council were set targets between 2003 and 2006 to increase participation in 
general, the numbers of under-represented groups taking part in cultural activity (in particular 
children and young people),  and the number of cultural programmes in areas of economic and 
social disadvantage. There was increased financial support for theatre companies working with 
children and young people, and those working with disabled artists were also particularly well 
supported over this time. Young people’s companies such as Wee Stories, Catherine Wheels and 
Visible Fictions were brought into the core funding portfolio over this period, and Theatre 
Workshop and Lung Ha’s also gained core funding for their work with disabled artists, including 
the former’s ‘Degenerate Festival’ that was launched in 2003. Unlike its English counterpart, the 
targets set on access and inclusion appeared to have been met and exceeded by 2006, perhaps due 
to a greater rigour on the part of Scottish funders to tie the strategic objectives directly to the 
activities of the companies that were allocated core funding, or perhaps due to the much more 
pivotal role of Local Authorities in Scotland’s cultural provision, thus enabling more focused, 
local-level initiatives. 
 
An additional Governmental objective that can be seen to exponentially increase over the 2000s is 
the importance of arts and culture to Scotland’s national identity and profile as presented to the 
rest of the world, with a particular focus on Europe and America. Here there are clear parallels 
with Tony Blair’s exploitation of the arts in his ‘Cool Britannia’ project, and perhaps early signs 
of the 2007 victory of the Scottish Nationalist Party, and Scotland’s subsequent commitment to a 
2014 vote for independence, in which the case for Scotland’s capacity to thrive as a fully 
independent country in an international climate will be key to the success of a yes vote. In 
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addition to the participation and inclusion objectives, therefore, the final target set was for the 
Arts Council to ‘develop the means of identifying the number of Scottish world class artists, 
companies and institutions for 2006’ (SAC, 2004a). The Arts Council also highlighted, among 
their four objectives, the necessity of ‘promoting Scotland internationally’ (SAC, 2004a).  It is 
noticeable, in the annual reports over this period, how much space is increasingly taken up by a 
roll call of Scottish cultural success, not only via the Creative Scotland Awards made to 
individual artists, but also to international recognition for film stars, (Sean Connery, Maggie 
Smith) novelists (Ian Rankin) and popular music (Franz Ferdinand, KT Tunstall), who arguably 
might be less validly claimed as ‘recent’ subsidised success stories (SAC, 2006). The importance 
of marketing a ‘confident, cultured Scotland’ appears many times throughout the Arts Council 
documents (SAC, 2003, 1), and in the 2004 report the potential of culture to offer a new and 
important brand to Scotland is explicitly spelt out: ‘the arts are a universal language, ideal for 
promoting the positive image of a contemporary Scotland as an attractive place to visit, and to 
live and work in’ (SAC, 2004b, 3). Gregory Burke’s Gargarin Way (2001) and Black Watch 
(2006) are two notable Scottish exports over this period. The latter, in particular, has been 
described by Joanne Zerdy as a ‘Scottish operative’ whereby ‘the production becomes the face of 
the NTS [National Theatre of Scotland] as the NTS acts an as international delegate for 
Scotland’s performing arts’ (Zerdy, 2013, 183). She continues, ‘[i]t may also stimulate interest in 
American audiences about Scottish culture and politics, which could lead to financial investment 
in tourism initiatives such as Homecoming Scotland’ (Zerdy, 2013, 190). If Black Watch had 
performed a successful ‘outward facing’ national identity, then the inaugural production of the 
National Theatre of Scotland in 2006, Home, had been notable in the dialogue it established with 
all corners of Scotland about itself, made up of work ‘by ten different directors, each charged with 
making a work round the word “home”, and each working with local people in a different part of 
the country’ (Leach, 2007, 176).  
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The early signs that forewarned of the eventual amputation of the arm that was intended to 
maintain the independence of arts funding and policy from Government control came to fruition 
with the publication of the Scottish Executive’s plan for the future of arts funding, Scotland’s 
Culture, in 2006. Some of its most inauspicious conclusions had already been foreseen in the 
recommendations made by the Cultural Commission in 2005, which saw a raft of last-ditch 
attempts by over ninety leading Scottish organisations, including Scottish National Opera and the 
Edinburgh International Festival, to urge the Commission to retain the arm’s length principle, and 
preserve the Arts Council or a body like it, which acts, in the words of the Scottish Arts Council’s 
chief executive, ‘as a check, or balance, against unhealthy concentrations of power which can 
skew the ultimate aims or purpose of any endeavour’ (Calvi, 2005). In the event, arts 
organisations might have preferred more, not less, of the commission’s recommendations to be 
taken up, including the necessity for additional annual funding of £100million and the 
maintenance of the arm’s length principle which the report did, to some degree, advocate. The 
Executive’s preference, as detailed in Scotland’s Culture was to award only an additional twenty 
million annually, and to fund national arts companies directly from that point on, with, as Reid 
notes, ‘increased funding tied to minimum standards of performance, touring, outreach and 
governance’(Reid, 2007, 73). All other companies would come under the strategic remit of a new 
organisation, Creative Scotland, which would replace both the Scottish Arts Council and Scottish 
Screen. 
 
If this was potentially politically catastrophic for the arts in Scotland, the economic impact would 
be felt even more directly, as it was announced that the 100-plus arts companies currently being 
core funded would no longer be able to rely on a continuation of automatic funding, but would 
have to apply for either long term ‘foundation funding’, or ‘flexible funding’ that could last for up 
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to three years. In the event, foundation funding was predominantly reserved for venues and 
ongoing development initiatives, with previously-core-funded theatre companies, other than the 
NTS which was now going to be taken under the Government’s remit, being required to apply for 
flexible funding in the future. Long standing core-funded companies, Borderline and 7:84, were 
told that they would have their funds withdrawn from March 2007 as part of, in the words of SAC 
chairman Richard Holloway, ‘a root-and-branch investigation of the whole landscape of arts 
funding in Scotland with a view to getting this logjam moving, as we'll be building in space for 
the surprises of new talent and new approaches’ (BBC, 2006). In the event, the majority of theatre 
companies on core-funded contracts were re-established on comparable budgets (if not 
comparable expectations of stability) within the new flexibly funded system, and new 
beneficiaries of the ‘space for surprises’ included Grid Iron, Giant Productions, Plan B and 
Vanishing Point.  
 
Welsh Arts Policy after Devolution 
In 1998 Arts Council Wales launched a fundamental review of their support for professional 
theatre in the context of three years of standstill funding and an unbalanced portfolio of 
revenue companies, with only four out of twenty clients receiving over £150,000 per annum. 
The review, particularly focused on Theatre in Education (TIE) and new writing, was drawn 
up after a significant public consultation, but despite the arts council’s insistence that there 
was popular support for their view that they were funding too many companies too thinly, its 
final recommendations were to prove hugely contentious on both fronts.  
 
It was inarguable that the eight TIE companies in Wales – Arad Goch, Clwyd TIE, Cwmni’r 
Frân Wen, Gwent Theatre, Hijinx, Theatr Iolo, Theatr Powys, and Spectacle Theatre - were 
now experiencing severe financial difficulties due to their historic links with the old eight 
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Local Education Authorities which had recently been dismantled and restructured, resulting 
in Local Authority funding for TIE dropping by half. In June 1999, ACW put out tenders for 
only five fixed term funding contracts for what was now termed Theatre for Young People, to 
replace the eight TIE funding agreements that currently existed. However, the proposed axing 
of funding for the long established Gwent Theatre and Theatre Powys in particular, not least 
in the light of potential legal challenges to the franchise process itself, sparked a sustained 
and impassioned assault on the directorship and management of ACW from arts 
professionals, politicians and the public, with MP LLew Smith calling for the Arts Council to 
be ‘scrapped and replaced with an organisation that is democratic, accountable and fair, with 
an understanding of the aspirations of communities right throughout Wales’ (Theatre-Wales, 
1999). With Arts Council staff threatening a vote of no confidence in their own management, 
and imminent legal challenges to the funding decisions, ACW was forced into a U-turn and 
reluctantly announced the suspension the Theatre for Young People element of the Drama 
Strategy and the re-instatement of three-year funding agreements to all eight existing TIE 
companies with effect from April 2000.  
 
A similar strategy, running parallel to the developments in young people’s theatre, was at the 
heart of ACW’s new theatre writing initiative, which invited three existing revenue-funded 
companies, Dalier Sylw, Made In Wales and the Sherman Theatre Company, to bid for the 
running of a single, bi-lingual new-writing centre, producing plays in Welsh and English. In 
the event, only Made In Wales was to have its funding axed, with Dalier Sylw, (renamed 
Sgript Cymru and ultimately, in 2006/07, to be merged with the Sherman), gaining increased 
funding, but still £90,000 short of the combined budget that had supported the two companies 
previously. There was an outcry at the decision from playwrights and supporters of new 
writing, who saw the new bi-lingual strategy as a cynical money-saving move that actually 
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cut the budget for new writing in both languages under the auspices of a review that was 
purported to be developing the capacity of new writing throughout Wales.  
 
While the concern over the loss of funding for new writing is well documented in the media, 
less noted was the loss, in the same year, of revenue funding for Brith Gof, arguably the most 
innovative and politically edgy company in recent Welsh history, with a significant academic 
and international following.  It seemed that as the control over new writing was becoming 
more and more centralised, as I will further detail, genuinely alternative theatre in Wales – in 
both a political and aesthetic sense – was to be pushed to the very margins of existence. In 
2000, in the wake of the calamitous drama review, a report on the management of ACW was 
commissioned by the Welsh Assembly, and compiled by Richard Wallace, who concluded 
that ‘the council has lost the confidence of those it serves in the arts community and in itself’ 
(BBC, 2000). The report was followed by the resignation of the Chief Executive, Joanna 
Weston, and the start of a large-scale restructuring process of ACW itself, which was, as in 
Scotland, to ultimately lead to control over arts funding and strategy being diverted further 
away from the Arts Council and ever closer to the directives of government ministers. 
 
In 2002, the re-structured Arts Council was rewarded by the Welsh Assembly with a twenty 
three per cent increase in funding – an announcement in the annual report ominously 
followed by the news of the Government’s cultural strategy (Creative Future: Cymru 
Greadigol) that would provide ‘the framework for the Arts Council of Wales’ strategy and 
includes many challenging targets for ACW’ (ACW, 2002, 6). Clearly, in the minds of the 
National Assembly, the additional money was allocated with some considerable strings 
attached. One significant project to be launched was the plan for a Welsh-language theatre 
powerhouse with a national brief. In an unprecedented move, rather than identifying an 
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existing company to take this agenda forwards, or putting the opportunity out to tender, the 
Arts Council itself established a steering committee, ‘charged with formulating the vision 
statement of the new company, registering the new company and recruiting the Chair and 
Board’ (ACW, 2002, 21). In effect, the ACW, now tied to some degree at least to government 
objectives, were creating their own company – Theatr Genedlaethol Cymru – to which they 
then awarded £430,150 for its first year of trading; a considerable sum in comparison to 
Sgript Cymru’s allocation of only £284,000. The rationale, it might well be argued, was to 
increase the funding of Welsh language theatre to somewhere near its English language 
theatre counterpart - Clwyd Theatr Cymru – which had now been afforded the status of a 
National Performing Company and was in receipt of revenue funding of  £1,383,819, but this 
could equally have been achieved by raising the funding of existing Welsh language theatre 
organisations, such as Sgript Cymru had been before it was required by ACW to offer a bi-
lingual remit. In the event, the blurring of lines between the objective and disinterested role 
of a national funding agency and the Arts Council’s now quasi-artistic affiliation to a 
governmental priority was a worrying sign of things to come.  
 
In 2004 the worst appeared to be on the horizon, with the First Minister, Rhodri Morgan, 
announcing his intention to redefine the relationship between the Welsh Assembly 
Government and the Arts Council of Wales as part of a wider programme to reform public 
services focusing in particular on the abolition of ‘quangos’ (Rhydderch, 2004).  A Culture 
Board, chaired by the Minister, would be established, in which the Arts Council, along with 
others, would participate. However, the crucial role of policy making would be removed from 
the Arts Council, and the six ‘nationally’ significant companies, including the English-
language theatre, Clwyd Theatr Cymru; and the newly established Welsh-language theatre, 
Theatr Genedlaethol, would be directly funded from the National Assembly from 2006, 
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leaving the Arts Council to develop the predominantly lottery-funded smaller organisations. 
The new funding agreements would, predictably, tie the national companies in to 
governmental objectives, committing them to ambassadorial cultural work on behalf of the 
country, and a contribution to the access, participation and inclusion agendas of the Welsh 
Assembly. Given the same direction of travel in Scotland, it is no wonder that Christopher 
Frayling, the Chairman of Arts Council England, was driven to note in his 2005 annual report 
that ‘[l]ines must be drawn between elected politicians or civil servants and an independent 
funding body, and we are monitoring developments in Wales and Scotland with some 
concern’ (Frayling, 2005, 2).  
 
However, in January 2006, after fourteen months of debate, and finally spurred into action by 
the controversial decision by the Labour-led Assembly not to renew the contract of Arts 
Council chairman Geraint Talfan Davies in favour of a more pro-government appointment, 
the leaders of the Welsh Liberal Democrats, Conservatives and Plaid Cymru demanded that 
the country’s culture minister reverse a string of policies that they feared were seriously 
jeopardising the arm’s length principle, including a suspension of the decision to directly 
fund the six national companies and remove the policy making remit from ACW. Following a 
vote in Plenary, the Wales Arts Review was commissioned by the Minister of Culture to 
review the role of ACW, and the plans to directly manage the six national companies was put 
on hold pending the conclusions of the review. Among the report’s recommendations were 
that a dual-strategy board should be established; in effect a partnership between ACW and the 
Welsh Assembly, but crucially that the six national companies should not be directly funded. 
The report did, however, acknowledge that the role, remit and strategic development of 
national companies needed addressing by the strategy board, and it also recommended the 
designation of ‘beacon companies’ among its clients, which would be allocated additional 
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funds from a ‘merit pot’ on the strength of ‘consistent best practice in their field, which may 
be art form or development based’ (Stephens, 2006, 26). So ACW, unlike the Scottish Arts 
Council, was to survive, but the strategic and economic prioritisation of the ‘national 
theatres’ that was now in train, was to have significant impact on the future of the 
independent theatre ecology throughout Wales, particularly in the wake of the imminent 
global economic crash. 
 
Into Austerity: 2008 – 2014 (England) 
In January 2008 the McMaster review of the arts was published, a document that did much to 
address the tide of instrumentalism that had engulfed artistic policy throughout the previous 
decade. The report re-instated the notion that excellence, innovation and risk-taking must be at the 
heart of artistic practice, and acknowledged the need to free such practice, in the words of Culture 
Secretary James Purnell, ‘from outdated structures and burdensome targets, which can act as 
millstones around the neck of creativity’ (McMaster, 2008, 4). Even McMaster’s references to the 
familiar priorities of audiences and diversity were weighted distinctly differently: advising against 
second guessing what audiences wanted, and advocating a culture where audiences might be 
productively challenged; and stressing that an understanding of diversity must go beyond race to 
encompass all aspects of society.  
  
The McMaster review was undertaken in 2007 alongside a spending review which saw Arts 
Council England receive an above-inflationary increase in funding for the arts with the caveat of a 
fifteen per cent reduction in administration costs that was to see their staffing reduced by twenty 
one per cent by 2010. The spending review also heralded in the Arts Council’s controversial 
investment strategy for the arts which proposed using the additional funding to increase the 
regular funding of selected Regularly Funded Organisations (RFOs) and introduce new RFOs at 
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the expense of removing regular funding from others. Across all arts sectors there was an increase 
in funding for seventy six per cent of existing organisations, eighty one new organisations 
brought into the portfolio, with 185 having their funding withdrawn. As the Arts Council Chair 
Stephen Frayling expressed it: ‘to champion innovation and excellence by bringing new 
organisations and giving others above-inflation increases rather than simply give all existing 
funded organisations a little more’ (ACE, 2008, 2). Not only was this one of the rare occasions 
when a significant cull of existing arts organisations was the result of deliberate strategy and 
increased funding, rather than cuts,  it was also spectacularly mismanaged.  
 
There was never any public dissemination of the strategy, rationale or criteria that lay behind 
the decision making, leading many to doubt, as Lyn Gardner noted, ‘that a genuine national 
strategy is being implemented. The Arts Council should immediately take steps to reassure us 
and prove that it really has been doing some joined-up thinking and not just been wielding the 
knife where it fancies’ (Gardner, 2007). This was all the more vital given that, as Gardner 
among others were quick to point out, ‘the RSC and National and larger regional reps seem to 
be sitting pretty and the main burden of the cuts appears to have fallen on smaller 
organisations and the independent sector’ (Gardner, 2007). Raising further concerns over the 
lack of transparency was the decision to notify those whose grants were being cut privately, 
with no initial publication of gains or losses, thus shrouding the overall picture in secrecy. 
There were also some decisions that had been taken on astoundingly incorrect evidence, such 
as the decision to cut funding for the Bush on the strength of audience figures that had been 
miscalculated by two-thirds.  
 
The Bush, along with the Orange Tree, the Northcott Theatre and the National Student Drama 
School all eventually won appeals against the original decision, but these successful appeals 
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were rare and, probably not incidentally, ‘backed by the likes of Ian McKellen, Judi Dench 
and Sam West’ (Edwardes, 2008). Long-established theatre companies to lose their regular 
funding in this review were many including Compass Theatre, David Glass Ensemble, Doo 
Cot, Kaos, London Bubble, The People Show, Pop up theatre, Red Shift, Rejects Revenge, 
Sphinx and Station House Opera. Companies who quietly benefitted from the debacle and 
were introduced to regular funding included Punchdrunk, Ockham’s Razor, Metro-Boulot-
Dodo and Fevered Sleep. If there seemed to be little rationale, as Gardner had argued, in 
where the axe fell, there certainly seemed to be evidence, given the theatre companies 
benefitting, that formalistic experimentation within the independent sector of the theatre 
ecology was being highly prized in the new awards being made. The funding review also saw 
the introduction of production company, Fuel, to regular funding, a pioneer in the rise of the 
independent theatre producer that I will discuss in detail in chapter two. Probably not 
incidentally, Fuel was a staunch promoter of the type of experimental performance that also 
characterised most of the newly recognised companies.  
 
The most ominous consequence of the Arts Council’s mishandling of the whole affair was the 
hostility and distrust engendered in the arts community, demonstrated by the mass showing of 
disapproval at the Young Vic in January 2008 when high profile actors and theatre artists 
gathered to publically express their anger to Arts Council chief executive Peter Hewitt. The 
Evening Standard’s theatre critic Nicholas de Jongh even argued that 
 
The Arts Council is an overstuffed bureaucracy. It is high time that government 
tried something different. Let the council be mothballed, its staff dismissed and 
its functions be taken over by the Department for Culture, which could draw up a 
diverse cultural blueprint for each art form. (de Jongh, 2008) 
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This was not an auspicious start for the year in which, come the crash of Lehman Brothers, 
everything was to change, and de Jongh might yet feel he should have been careful what he 
wished for. 
 
By the summer of 2010, the arts were not only facing the worst national financial crisis in the 
Arts Council’s history, but were dealing once again with a Tory-led government for the first 
time in nearly twenty years. ‘We all knew this year would be tough’ the Arts Council’s 
annual report begins, and they were not to be proved wrong (Forgan, 2010, 2). In May 2010, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, announced an initial round of public 
service cuts of six billion pounds for the 2010/11 financial year. This resulted in a cut to the 
Arts Council’s grant from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, of nineteen million, 
in addition to the four million they had already cut from the coming year’s budget, and on top 
of the previous twenty one per cent reduction in Arts Council staff in line with the 2007 
Spending Review.  
 
The opening of the 2011 annual report was no better, beginning ‘this was the year in which 
the whole nation, including the arts, had to face fundamental choices about where real 
priorities lay in the context of a severe recession and a government determined to reduce the 
public spending deficit’ (Forgan, 2011, 4). Just three years after the strategic overhaul of 
2008, there was to be another significant revision of the national portfolio, this time out of 
necessity rather than choice. Again the Arts Council resisted calls for the changes to be 
spread evenly across existing RFOs, and instead drew a line under all existing partnerships, 
requiring all organisations to apply from the outset to be taken on under the new National 
Portfolio agreement to take effect from 2012. Perhaps learning from previous mistakes, this 
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was undertaken with much greater transparency and organisations were asked to explain, in 
their application, precisely how they expected to contribute to the realisation of the Arts 
Council’s ten-year strategy for the Arts, ‘Achieving Great Art For Everyone’ which focused 
on excellence, increased access, increased participation for young people, sustainability, 
leadership and diversity. 
 
While the requirement for artists and organisations to now fit their plans to the given 
framework might have been transparent and equitable, it also concluded, in explicit terms and 
counter to the recommendations of McMaster, the inevitable trajectory set on course by New 
Labour, and already established in Scotland and Wales, for the artistic agenda to be set, not 
by artists, but by the Arts Council, who in turn were answerable to the government via the 
public service agreement targets. The national portfolio was to mark the point where 
accountability to targets would finally become the over-riding concern for arts organisations 
in receipt of regular funding, and smaller organisations with less administrative capacity, and 
the most propensity to take artistic risks that had no certain outcome, would inevitably suffer 
the most. Risk-taking, it seemed, was to be supported principally by the lottery-funded grants 
for the arts programme, which from this point on would be available only to artists outside of 
the National Portfolio, who would arguably enjoy greater freedom from the more punitive 
target-driven culture of the NPOs, but at the considerable cost of the insecurity and lack of 
sustainability of project-by-project funding. 
 
New organisations to join the portfolio included Gecko Theatre, Red Earth Theatre, Clod 
Ensemble, Coney, 20 Stories High, Dreamspeakthink, Propeller Theatre Company, NoFit 
State Circus, Eclipse Theatre and Slung Low. Among the existing RFO organisations who 
failed to win portfolio status were Action Space Mobile, Box Clever, Faulty Optic, Forkbeard 
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Fantasy, Foursight, Nitro, Proper Job, Quicksilver, Reckless Sleepers, Shared Experience, 
Third Angel, Trestle and Yellow Earth. Despite the high regard in which many of the above 
were held by the arts community, and the significant international profiles many enjoyed, the 
response was much more subdued and submissive than the unified, high profile outcry in 
2008 for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was now the age of austerity and there was a certain 
degree of ‘cuts fatigue’ across society as a whole. Secondly, the Arts Council had approached 
the situation with a much greater sense of responsibility and transparency for its actions and, 
thirdly, the Arts Council had tried to take the brunt of the cuts to its own organisation as 
much as was possible, limiting the cut to the budget from which they funded arts 
organisations to fifteen per cent, rather than the twenty nine point six per cent cut to the Arts 
Council as a whole. This necessitated a further reduction in the Arts Council’s own operating 
budget of fifty per cent by the end of the spending review in 2015 – a cut which, on top of its 
previous fifteen per cent cut - would ultimately, by the time of writing, see the Arts Council 
reduced to a skeleton of its former self, with its capacity to lead on strategy, to envision and 
manage change for the sector, and to lobby for support seriously diminished.     
 
Both the immediate consequences and the long-term implications of these cuts to the Arts 
Council were explicitly highlighted in the aftermath of the second round of NPO decisions 
which were announced in July 2014 for the subsequent three year funding period. Unlike the 
2011 round, where there were significant changes to the small-medium scale theatre company 
sector, bringing in a number of companies who had relatively recently begun to gain high 
profile attention to replace a similar number of long standing companies from whom RFO 
status was withdrawn; in this round the cuts to the independent theatre sector far outweighed 
the gains, with those losing 100 per cent of their NPO funding including Ridiculusmus, Dark 
Horse, Theatre Sans Frontieres, Whalley Range All Stars, Propeller, Big Brum, Carnesky 
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Productions and Red Ladder. Theatre companies producing their own work to be introduced 
to the portfolio were Chol Theatre, Third Angel, Tangle and Wired Aerial. Of these, both 
Chol and Third Angel had been regularly funded organisations prior to the 2011 round, 
making their ‘new’ NPO status from 2015 read rather more like the reinstatement of 
established companies which should never have been dropped, rather than an embrace of up 
and coming new practice. Both the contraction of the field of emergent core-funded and 
independently constituted theatre makers in England, and the financially-necessitated 
reduction of the Arts Council’s strategic role are, as I will now discuss, aspects of a path  
already well-trodden by this point north and west of the borders. 
 
Into Austerity: 2008 – 2014 (Scotland) 
In Scotland, the proposed new organisation for the arts, Creative Scotland, took an 
inauspiciously long time to come about. In 2007 the Joint Board of the 
Scottish Arts Council and Scottish Screen took over the old functions of each organisation 
and the remit to strategically plan for the incoming Creative Scotland. But not until 2010 was 
the new organisation clearly established and equipped to take over the funding and strategic 
management of the arts (other than the national organisations) – albeit within the now-too-
familiar co-ordinates set by the Scottish Executive. As the chief executives of the out-going 
SAC and Scottish Screen confirm: 
 
The Scottish Government has given a very clear indication as to what Creative 
Scotland’s four national priorities should be. Both Scottish Screen and the 
Scottish Arts Council are committed to delivering against these priorities during 
2010/11 as we move towards Creative Scotland and the development of its first 
full corporate plan in 2011/12. (SAC, 2011, 5) 
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The four priorities were again focused on the combination of encouragement of artists, the 
necessity of improving access and participation and the raising of the international profile of 
Scotland, in the words of the corporate plan, ‘to extend and increase the wider benefits of arts 
and culture, including their contribution to the promotion and development of our unique 
national culture and its wider place in the international sphere’ (SAC, 2011, 5). The arm in 
the arm’s length principle seemed to have undergone its final amputation with the arrival of 
Creative Scotland. In 2012 Guardian critic Charlotte Higgins noted that: 
 
at no point in my extensive reading about Creative Scotland have I come across 
an example of the organisation challenging the government. The point of an arts 
council is to act as a buffer zone between artists and the government and at times 
to challenge it. Creative Scotland insists it is at ‘arm's length’ from the 
government, but if it is breaking ranks, it is happening behind the scenes. This 
seems particularly important when some fear that Scottish culture is being 
harnessed as a semi-political tool in the branding of ‘Team Scotland’. (Higgins, 
2012a) 
 
It was possibly unfortunate that Creative Scotland, having already been inauspiciously 
conceived, and already having suffered a difficult and prolonged birth, was finally delivered 
at the height of austerity. Just like its English counterpart, it had to come to terms with the 
fact that there might well be less grant-in-aid funding from the Executive in the future than 
there had been in the past. Although an additional share of Lottery money had been allocated 
to attempt to alleviate the cuts, and would, in fact, increase the overall total spend, this could 
not be used for core funding, due to the additionality clause in the original lottery legislation. 
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As a result, as Joyce McMillan summarises, ‘the organisation, therefore, needs to withdraw 
regular grant income from some arts companies, to reduce the regular element of the funding 
of others, and to set up some large project funds open to all comers, and it needs to make 
these decisions on the basis of current artistic performance’ (McMillan, 2012). Not, as 
McMillan concluded, ‘rocket science for any well-run arts agency’, but Creative Scotland 
decided instead to announce the withdrawal of funding from the entire portfolio of flexibly-
funded companies, resulting in throwing ‘some 49 Scottish arts organisations from a 
condition of modest security into a state of complete insecurity, in which they have to bargain 
from project to project for their right to exist’ (McMillan, 2012).  
 
One of the longest standing and most politically astute arts commentators in the UK, 
McMillan was clear where the blame for the debacle should lie, stating that ‘this review 
raises serious questions about the board of Creative Scotland, which has knowingly appointed 
to key roles in Scotland’s cultural life people who clearly embrace a commerce-driven 
ideology that Scotland in general, and its cultural community in particular, has rejected at 
every available opportunity’ (McMillan, 2012). The ‘”supposedly” social-democratic SNP 
government’ also had questions to answer about ‘why it continues to preside so complacently 
over such needlessly controlling systems of administration, and so much insidious market-
inflected corrosion of the values for which it says it stands’(McMillan, 2012).  
 
Where previously there had been a distinction between a fairly small cohort of flexibly 
funded companies (core in all but name), and a much larger raft of companies which were 
awarded reasonably regular project funding, the revised category of flexible funding was a 
kind of hybrid of the two, enabling a maximum of just two year funding to previously 
flexibly funded companies, in addition to a number of newcomers from the old project 
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funded cohort including Ankar Arts, Mischief La Bas, Fire Exit, Theatre Cryptic, Vox Motus 
and Birds of Paradise. Foundation funding, from this point on, was targeted at buildings and 
programmes, leaving none of the independent theatre companies, however well established, 
with the capacity to plan for more than twenty four months at a time.  
 
By October 2012 the artistic community’s dissatisfaction had come to a head with over 100 
Scottish artists - amounting to the bulk of the Scottish arts establishment - signing an open 
letter to Creative Scotland’s chairman, Sir Sandy Crombie, protesting against the routinely 
‘ill-conceived decision-making; unclear language, lack of empathy and regard for Scottish 
culture’. The letter continued, ‘We observe an organisation with a confused and intrusive 
management style married to a corporate ethos that seems designed to set artist against artist 
and company against company’ (in Higgins, 2012b). In December, the chief executive who 
had overseen the establishment of Creative Scotland, Andrew Dixon, resigned from his post, 
and Creative Scotland began the process of restoring trust with the arts community. In the 
annual report of 2013, Sir Sandy Crombie acknowledged that ‘During the year it became 
clear that we were not getting everything right and that elements of the way we were working 
and our approach were alienating a significant proportion of the people and organisations that 
we are here to support’ (Creative Scotland, 2013, 3). One significant change to appear in 
Creative Scotland’s subsequent ten year plan, published in 2014, was the restoration of three 
year regular funding contracts, open to application in the summer of 2014. 
 
Into Austerity: 2008 – 2014 (Wales) 
In 2007 plans began in earnest for the development of an English Language National Theatre 
for Wales, with an additional £250,000 pledged by the Welsh Assembly. In 2008 the artistic 
director, John McGrath, was appointed to lead an organisation which, like the National 
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Theatre of Scotland, would be a building-less company which would seek to collaborate with 
the existing infrastructure of theatre companies and venues to create ‘a new theatre ecology 
for Wales’ (ACW, 2007). The model of the company’s launch in 2010 also echoed the NTS’s 
strategic approach, with 12 inaugural productions taking place across Wales, beginning with 
A Good Night Out in the Valleys at Blackwood Miner’s Institute in March of that year.  
 
2010 also saw, in Wales as in Scotland and England, an austerity-provoked root and branch 
review of its revenue funding resulting in thirty two existing organisations having their 
funding withdrawn or significantly cut. Established theatre companies to be hit included 
Hijinx, Theatre Powys and Gwent Theatre. There was an inevitable outcry from those 
companies and communities affected by the cuts, and accusations that the decisions would 
cause irreparable damage to the whole arts ecology in Wales. New companies introduced to 
revenue funding were few with NoFit State Circus and Theatr Ffynnon representing the 
theatre sector, as well as a strategic injection of increased funding into a significant number 
of community and grass-roots organisations in some of Wales’ most deprived regions. 
 
Interestingly, there was little in the media coverage of such reports which correspondingly 
emphasised the significant gains made by the national organisations; the newly established 
National Theatre Wales’, for example, received a funding increase of £335,000 to take its 
annual revenue funding in 2011/12 to £1,685,000. Taken alongside the allocation to Theatr 
Genedlaethol Cymru, the Welsh Language National Theatre, of £1,052,942, it becomes clear 
that, whatever might prove to be the benefits of the two national companies established by 
ACW, the money that was no longer available to fund independently established and 
constituted companies was not inconsiderable.  
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Looking ahead.... 
It is notable that between 1995 and 2010, prior to the introduction of NoFit State and 
Ffynnon, not one independently-founded, project-funded theatre company was introduced 
into the Welsh revenue portfolio, and none have been introduced since. Companies who were 
revenue funded in 1995 have been continued, folded, or amalgamated to produce fewer and 
more centralised and building-based organisations, to the sacrifice of a diverse independent 
sector with progression opportunities to sustainable funding contracts for young emergent 
companies seemingly non-existent, beyond theatre for children and young people, and theatre 
for people with disabilities which both continue to be relatively well supported. Conversely, 
by 2014, Wales had no fewer than four establishment institutions funded at over £1 million, 
two of which had been founded by the Arts Council (National Theatre of Wales and Theatr 
Genedlaethol Cymru) and one of which (Sherman Cymru) was the result of a merger between 
formerly independent companies and a building based theatre. 
 
The relative absence of Welsh companies in chapter two is precisely down to this deficit, and 
it is noticeable that since its first production in 2010 the National Theatre of Wales has 
worked with Nofitstate and Volcano, two of the very few remaining experimental 
independent companies in Wales, but this number is dwarfed by partnerships with companies 
from across Europe, including Rimini Protokoll, and companies core funded by the English 
Arts Council, including Told by an Idiot, Fevered Sleep, Wildworks and Frantic Assembly. 
There is no lack of imagination or innovation in John McGrath’s artistic directorship, and 
Welsh artists and writers feature heavily in the National Theatre of Wales’ portfolio of work 
to date, but the innovations fostered by emergent companies sustained by regular revenue 
funding are simply not there for the NTW to draw on as they are sadly no longer part of the 
theatre ecology in Wales. Artistic innovation, it seems, is now entrusted to the National 
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Theatres that are inescapably part of the political establishment, which seriously limits the 
potential for Welsh theatre to mount any meaningful challenge the Welsh ‘brand’ as designed 
and authorised by the Welsh administration in the years to come. It is ominous in the 2013 
ACW report, for anyone who values the arm’s length principle, quite how many times the 
Welsh Government is praised for its support, or ‘applauded for its foresight’, and the 
conclusion of the chief executive, Nick Capaldi, that ‘arts and culture ... are a proper matter 
for our celebration, and for government’s closest attention’ (ACW, 2013, 10), seems to 
confirm the future direction of arts policy in Wales. 
 
Despite the general sense that Creative Scotland made a welcome change of course in 2013, it 
is still notable in the 2014-15 annual plan that the entire ecology of independent theatre 
making companies is now being funded solely from lottery money that is still nominally 
reserved for ‘additional’ rather than ‘core’ spending. The implication is that, culturally, these 
organisations are now seen as merely ‘additional’ to the building-based and national 
organisations that are either funded from grant-in-aid or directly from the Scottish Executive, 
and are thus entirely dependent on the fortunes of the Lottery, as is the sector’s long term 
survival. This may, of course, change when the new funding regime comes into force, but it 
seems much more likely that what will happen is that the majority of currently flexibly 
funded companies will become regularly funded companies over a three year period, in line 
with the National Portfolio Organisations in England. The important distinction is that much 
of England’s independent sector remains funded by core, statutory, grant-in-aid funding, 
leaving the independent ecology in Scotland somewhat more vulnerable. Joyce Macmillan 
offers some seeds of hope in her support for Scotland’s Culture secretary, Fiona Hyslop, and 
her cautious optimism about the ‘better shape’ of the institutional landscape, but she does 
express concern about Creative Scotland’s continuing ‘silence’ with regards to ‘addressing 
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the question of exactly how it will make its funding decisions’, noting that Scottish arts 
policy of recent history has  
 
undergone a triple challenge; first from those who rightly rejected the old, rigid 
canon of “great art”; then from the shock-troops of extreme individualism who 
wrongly argued that artistic judgment can never be anything more than individual 
and subjective; and finally from the purely social, economic and bureaucratic 
measures of the value of art that rushed in to fill the vacuum. (McMillan, 2014) 
 
 Creative Scotland’s ten year plan itself, sets out five priorities of experimentation, access, 
quality of life, a skilled workforce and, unsurprisingly given the pending referendum, the 
distinctiveness of Scotland as a creative nation that is connected to the wider world.  
 
If the Arts Council of England was prescient, in 2005, to monitor ‘developments in Wales 
and Scotland with some concern’ (Frayling, 2005, 2), any hope it might have had of averting 
the foreseeable shortening of the arm’s length, the reduction of the Arts Council’s capacity 
for strategic leadership and the constriction of the independent theatre company ecology 
turned out to be short lived.  The 2014 funding round confirmed the direction ACE had been 
heading since 2010, seeing the ecology of small companies suffer so that flagship buildings 
and national organisations, predominantly in London, could be sustained. Moreover, there 
was a further raid on lottery funding, previously restricted under its ‘additionality’ clause for 
project grants, to fund some NPO organisations with 100 per cent lottery money for the first 
time. On raising the danger of this with Mags Patten, the Arts Council’s National Director of 
Communications, in a public meeting in July 2014, she responded that it had been essential to 
counter the government cuts in grant-in-aid funding, and so long as the Arts Council ‘can be 
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seen to be using lottery money in a distinct and transparent way’, and the percentage of 
lottery money used for core company costs remained ‘proportional’, she felt that the 
perceived threat of it ultimately replacing grant for aid was minimal (Patten, 2014). Her 
following assurance that the Arts Council had received ‘commitment from both political 
parties to the principle of grant-in-aid’ proved unsurprisingly less reassuring to the audience 
of artists whom she addressed, than it seemingly had to the Arts Council itself (Patten, 2014).  
 
To conclude, for different ideological reasons and under different ideological administrations, 
the future of the independent theatre sector in the UK is looking increasingly fragile at the 
time of writing, and we have come a long way from the golden age of the expansion of the 
sector, in Scotland and England at least, under New Labour and the Scottish Parliament in the 
2000s. In the following chapter I will examine in detail how this ecology grew over the 
period of this study, and how it has secured an artistic legacy within mainstream theatre that 
might yet prove, ironically, more sustainable than the independent sector itself. 
 
